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INTRODUCTION
iversification is a cornerstone principle of prudent investment
practices.2 It is also a foundational principle of federally regulated,
tax-subsidized retirement plans.' Yet, the importance of diversification is
being lost on Congress. By failing to enact pension reform that restricts
401 (k) plan investment in employer securities ("company stock"), Congress
continues to jeopardize the retirement security of twenty-three million of
the nation's forty-two million 401 (k) plan participants who have access to
a company stock investment alternative.4
Employers' unfettered ability to offer company stock as a 401 (k) plan
investment alternative can have a devastating effect on American workers'
retirement security. Enron Corporation ("Enron"), once the seventh-largest
business firm with over $100 billion in annual revenues,5 provides the most
2 Zvi Bodie & Dwight B. Crane, Personal Investing: Advice, Theory and
Evidence from a Survey of TIAA-CREF Participants 5 (May 28, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3?delivery.cfln/
9706193.pdfabsstractid=36158) (summarizing six generally accepted investment
principles, including the principle that "[a]ll investors should diversify their total
portfolio across asset classes, and the equity portion should be well-diversified
across industries and companies").
' Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sunden, 401(K)s and Company Stock: How
Can We Encourage Diversification?, ISSUES IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Retirement
Research, Chestnut Hill, Mass.), July 2002, at 2, http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/
issues/ib 9.pdf.
4 See OLIVIA S. MITCHELL & STEPHEN P. UTKUS, THE ROLE OF COMPANY
STOCK IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9250, Oct. 2002), at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9250.pdf.
Mitchell and Utkus explain why over half of 401 (k) participants are affected:
[O]nly 3 percent of 401(k) plans actually offer company stock as an
investment option.... Yet because these plans are mainly sponsored by
large firms, they account for a substantial subset of the DC [defined
contribution] plan participant and asset universe. Consequently, those
firms offering company stock include 42 percent of all DC plan
participants and 59 percent of all DC plan assets. To put it differently,
only 3 percent of 401(k) plans offer company stock, but some 23 million
DC plan participants have access to company stock within their employer
plans, and those DC plans command assets of $1.2 trillion, in total.
Id.
5 See Allan Sloan & Michael Iskoff, The Enron Effect: As the Accounting
Scandal Spreads, Regulators and Politicians Are Pounding the Table for Reform.
But Will Anything Really Change?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2002, at 34 ("The key to
the Enron mess is that the company was allowed to give misleading financial
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visible example. Its corporate shenanigans led to a dramatic decline in
company stock value that left Enron employees facing unemployment with
more than $1 billion in 401(k) plan losses attributable to company stock
holdings.6
Like most large, publicly traded companies, Enron sponsored a 401 (k)
plan ("Enron 401 (k) Plan")7 with a company stock investment alternative.
Over 20,000 Enron 401(k) Plan participants directed their employee
elective deferral contributions into any one of twenty employer-selected
investment alternatives,9 including mutual funds, a Schwab account that
information to the world for years. Those fictional figures, showing nicely rising
profits, enabled Enron to become the nation's seventh largest company, with $100
billion of annual revenues.").
6 The Enron Collapse and Its Implications for Worker Retirement Security:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong.
25 (2002) [hereinafter Hearings on the Enron Collapse] (statement of Rep. Rush
D. Holt, Member, House Comm. on Education and the Workforce).
' Id. at 214 (Enron Corporation Savings Plan, as amended and restated,
effective July 1, 1999, Appendix G) [hereinafter Plan].
8 See Patrick J. Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retire-
ment Plans, CRS Rpt. for Cong., 107th Cong. at 3 (Jan. 23, 2002) [hereinafter
Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans], at
http://www.ieeeusa.org/forum/issues/reports/enronpension.pdf (55% of plans
sponsored by large, publicly traded companies offer company stock as an
investment option); Jack L. VanDerhi, EBRI [Employee Benefit Research Institute]
Special Report: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans: Results of a Survey of ISCEBS
Members, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 3-4 (Jan. 31, 2002), http://www.ebri.org/pdfs/
iscebs.pdf [hereinafter EBRI Special Report: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans]
(survey of 3346 members of the International Society of Certified Employee
Benefit Specialists found that 48% of respondents reported a company stock
investment option in their client's/ employer's 401(k)plan, with large plans much
more likely to offer a company stock investment altemative--73% compared to
32% for small plans); Profit Sharing/ 401(k) Council of America, Company Stock
2002: Examining Company Stock in Profit Sharing/401(k) Plans, tbl.2, at
http://www.psca.org/data/compstock2002.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (also on
file with author) [hereinafter PSCA, Company Stock 2002] (76.7% of respondent
plans with 5000 or more plan participants offered company stock as an investment
alternative, compared to 54.7% of respondent plans with 500 to 4999 plan
participants and 13.5% of respondent plans with less than 500 plan participants
offering company stock as an investment option).
9 Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 103 (statement of Cindy
K. Olson, Executive Vice President, Human Resources and Community Relations,
Enron Corporation).
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was similar to a self-directed brokerage account,10 and an Enron company
stock fund account ("Enron company stock").1"
Like most American workers who participate in 401(k) plans, Enron
401 (k) Plan participants did not receive independent, individually-tailored
investment advice.' 2 What they did receive, however, was direct and
indirect encouragement from Enron company executives to invest their
employee elective deferral contributions in Enron company stock. Enron
provided direct encouragement through its executives' vigorous support of
the company's future profitability. 3 Indirect encouragement came in the
1" See Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Hewitt Study Shows Employee
Demand as Driving Force Behind Self-Directed Brokerage Accounts (Mar. 12,
2001), at http://www.hewittasia.com./ep/resource/newsroom/pressrel/2001/03-12-
01.htm [hereinafter Hewitt Associates, Self-Directed Brokerage Accounts]
(defining "self-directed brokerage account" as "a 401(k) investment option that
allows [plan] participants to maintain some or all [of their] assets in a separate
individual brokerage account for the purpose of holding individual stocks, bonds
or mutual funds that are not offered as part of the plan's main investment
options.").
"Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 104 (statement of Mike
Rath, Benefits Manager, Enron Corporation).
2 See id. at 8 (statement of Elaine L. Chao, Secretary, United States Depart-
ment of Labor).
13 Id. at 182 (testimony of Thomas 0. Padgett, Senior Lab Analyst at EOTT (an
Enron Subsidiary)) ("Through my time with Enron, the top management of the
company constantly encouraged us to invest our savings in Enron stock. I took the
fact that the Company matched our savings only with Enron stock as a further
endorsement of the stock as a safe retirement investment. More recent statements
made by Enron's top management, including e-mails from Ken Lay, about the
Company's stock also caused me to keep investing my savings into the stock. I
remember, in the Fall of 2000, Enron's top executives telling us at an employee
meeting and by Company e-mail that Enron's stock price was going to increase to
at least $120 per share. When Mr. Skilling resigned last August [2001], Mr. Lay
told us that the Company was stronger than it had ever been."); see also STAFF OF
J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 537 (Comm. Print 2003),
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-3-03-vol 1 .pdf [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON] ("Even as the price of Enron stock declined
during 2001, management told employees of a bright future for Enron. For
example, Mr. Lay was optimistic in his predictions for the future of Enron stock,
even when an employee specifically asked him about Enron stock in the context of
the Enron Savings Plan. Similarly, Enron's Executive Vice President for Human
Resources and Community Relations, Cindy Olson, said that employees should
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form of plan fiduciaries' unwavering decisions to offer company stock as
an investment alternative and make employer matching contributions in the
form of Enron company stock.' 4 This encouragement continued amid
almost daily disclosures about Enron's worsening financial condition and
questionable accounting practices, including reports that Enron had lost
$618 million and written down $1.2 billion of its net worth due to off-
balance-sheet partnerships. 5 Despite these reports, which led to Enron
company stock plummeting from a January 2001 high of more than $80 a
share to a January 2002 low of less than $1 per share, 16 Enron 401 (k) Plan
participants responded to employer encouragement by collectively
investing more than 60% of their 401(k) plan assets in Enron company
stock, with only 11% of the plan's Enron company stock concentration
attributable to employer matching contributions. 7
To make matters worse, Enron executives cashed in stock options and
sold stock in equity compensation plans valued at approximately $128
million 8 while Enron 401(k) Plan participants were unable to diversify
their company stock holdings. In October of 2001, Enron plan fiduciaries
'Absolutely!' invest their contributions to the Enron Savings Plan in Enron
stock.").
14 See generally Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 226 (Enron
Corporation Savings Plan).
"5 Id. at 299 (Memorandum from Sherron Watkins to Mr. Lay) (questioning
Enron's "aggressive" accounting and voicing concern that partnership deals would
"implode in a wave of accounting scandals"); Gretchen Morgenson, A Bubble No
One Wanted to Pop, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL 8718684 (on
October 16, 2001, Enron disclosed "that it had lost $618 million in the most recent
quarter and that because earlier financial statements had been inaccurate, it was
looping $1.2 billion of its net worth."); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION OF ENRON, supra note 13, at 537.
16 Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans,
supra note 8, at 1; see also Enron Debacle Will Force Clean Up of Company Stock
Use in DC Plans, DC PLAN INVESTING, Dec. 11, 2001, at 3.
'" Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans,
supra note 8, at 3. These numbers are accurate as of Dec. 21, 2000. Id.
'" Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Accounting for Enron: Enron Pensions
Had More Room at the Top, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at A4, 2002 WL-WSJ
3383703 ("At the same time that employees were locked into much of the Enron
stock in their 401(k) plans, executives last year sold shares valued at about $128
million, on top of $486 million in sales in 2000, according to Thomson
Financial/Lancer Analytics, which tracks insider transactions. Mr. Lay alone sold
shares valued at $29.8 million during that period.").
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implemented a scheduled blackout 9 to accommodate a change in Enron's
third-party plan administrator.2" During the blackout period in which Enron
401 (k) Plan participants were restricted from changing investment alloca-
tions in their accounts, 2' Enron company stock lost an additional 35% of its
then fair market value.22 Shortly after the blackout restrictions were lifted,
Enron filed for what was then the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history,
leaving Enron 401 (k) Plan participants with irretrievable losses.23
Unfortunately, Enron was not an isolated incident. During the longest
bull market in U.S. history, millions of American workers responded to
their employers' direct and indirect encouragement by investing a
significant portion of their 40 1(k) plan assets in company stock. Less than
8 months following the demise of Enron, WorldCom executives were led
away in handcuffs for allegedly fraudulent accounting practices that
underreported over $7 billion in expenses.24 That corporate scandal left
WorldCom employees facing unemployment with over $1.1 billion in
"9 See ERISA § 101(i)(7)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(i)(7)(A) (2003), amended by
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 306, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7244 (2002) (defining a
blackout period as any period of three or more consecutive business days during
which the ability ofparticipants in an individual account plan to "direct or diversify
assets credited to their accounts, to obtain loans from the plan, or to obtain
distributions from the plan is temporarily suspended, limited or restricted").
20 See Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 104 (statement of
Mike Rath, Benefits Manager, Enron Corporation). Rath explains that in January
of 2001, Enron began soliciting bids from third-party service providers to replace
Northern Trust as the plan administrator for all of Enron's qualified retirement
plans. In May of 2001, Hewitt was selected as Northern Trust's replacement. Id.
21 Id. at 105-07 (statement of Scott Peterson, Global Practice Leader for
Defined Contribution Services, Hewitt Associates) (indicating that the blackout
began at the close of business on October 26, 2001 and ended on November 13,
2001).22 See Ellen E. Schultz, 'Lockdowns'of40l (k) Plans Draw Scrutiny, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 16, 2002, at Cl, 2002 WL-WSJ 3383076 ("On Oct. 26, the last day
employees could trade their accounts, the stock closed at $15.40 a share; by the end
of the lockdown on Nov. 13, it had fallen to $9.98.").
23 Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans,
supra note 8, at 1. Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 200 1. Id.
24 Jim Krane, WorldCom to Hand Out $36 Million in Severance, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 2,2002, at E6, 2002 WL 3916038 ("After declaring that its accounting
practices had hidden $3.8 billion in expenses, WorldCom declared the largest
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in U.S. history. Since that July filing, the company has
revised the amount of accounting improprieties up to $7.1 billion. Recent reports
said the final total may reach $9 billion.").
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401 (k) plan losses attributable to company stock holdings.2' And, contrary
to pension reform opponents that characterize the Enron and WorldCom
debacles as isolated examples of unscrupulous employers that inappropri-
ately promote company stock ownership,26 significant losses have occurred
in the absence of such levels of abuse. Employees of Rite Aid, Lucent
Technologies, Nortel Networks, Qwest Communications, the Williams
Companies, Providian Financial Corporation, IKON Office Solutions, and
Global Crossing, to name only a few, have suffered similar fates. 7
With the Enron debacle as its primary impetus, the Bush Administra-
tion and Congress heard renewed public outcries for pension reform.28 The
Bush Administration and Congress initially focused their collective efforts
on legislative reform proposals amending the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"),29 the federal regulatory scheme governing
employee benefit plans, including 401 (k) retirement plans.
While disagreement exists about the appropriate means to resolve
excessive investment in company stock, there is a general consensus about
the current regulatory scheme's inability to provide the answer. Over the
more than twenty-five years since its enactment, subsequent federal
legislative and regulatory efforts have transformed ERISA into a relic of its
25 Yuki Noguchi, Workers' 401(k)s Lost $1.1 Billion, WASH. POST, July 10,
2002, at EO1, 2002 WL 3450622.
26 See, e.g., Main Street Opposes Levin Senate Stock Options Bill, Republican
Main Street Partnership, at http://www.republicanmainstreet.org/news.asp?record
_no=2104 (Feb. 25, 2002) (also on file with author); 401(k) Plans After Enron,
VeraVest Investments, at http://veravest.con/ww/wwl69/previous/03_02.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2003) (also on file with author).
27 Patrick J. Purcell, Employer Stock in Retirement Plans: Investment Risk and
Retirement Security, CRS Rpt. for Cong., 107th Cong. at 1 (July 2002) [hereinafter
Purcell, Employer Stock in Retirement Plans], http://www.benefitslink.com/
articles/crs.empstock2002.pdf.
28 Excessive investment in qualifying employer securities and real property
was initially addressed by the Department of Labor and Congress in 1997. See
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND
PENSION BENEFITS PLANS, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON EMPLOYER
ASSETS IN ERISA EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLANS (1997), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
publications/acemar.htm [hereinafter DOL, EMPLOYER ASSETS IN ERISA
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLANS]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., 401(K) PENSION
PLANS: EXTENT OF PLANS' INVESTMENTS IN EMPLOYER SECURITIES AND REAL
PROPERTY, GAO/HEHS-98-28 (1997) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, 401 (K) PENSION
PLANS].29 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (providing pension reform).
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time. The pre-ERISA retirement plan universe consisted almost exclusively
of "traditional retirement plans," which are defined herein to include
employer-funded defined benefit plans and supplemental individual
account plans whose assets are invested by plan fiduciaries that remain
personally liable for imprudent investment decisions. Congress designed
ERISA within this context to foster two federal policy goals: the primary
goal of retirement security3" and the secondary goal of employee owner-
ship.31 To promote the retirement security goal that was predominantly
advanced through employers' defined benefit plans, ERISA contains a
series of fiduciary standards and prohibited transaction rules that require
plan fiduciaries to diversify plan assets among prudent investment
alternatives and restrict investment in company stock.32 To promote the
employee ownership goal that was historically relegated to supplemental
individual account plans, ERISA creates a series of modifications to these
standards and rules to accommodate a greater degree of individual account
plan investment in company stock.3
3 0 H.R. REP. NO. 93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670,4676
("One of the most important matters of public policy facing the nation today is how
to assure that individuals who have spent their careers in useful and socially
productive work will have adequate incomes to meet their needs when they
retire.").
3" Written Statement Submitted by Interested Organizations and Individuals
on H.R. 10470: Retirement Income Security for Employees Act 3, 93d Cong. 468
(Oct. 1, 1973) ("In a stock bonus plan, the emphasis is on employee incentive and,
accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code has long permitted employers to use a
stock bonus plan to create employee ownership in employer securities"); Welfare
and Pension Plan Legislature: Hearings Before the General Subcommittee on
Labor of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462, 93d Cong. 665
(Feb. 20, 1973) (statement of Raymond H. Giesecke, Chairman of the Board of
Directors, McGraw-Edison Co.) ("The Company's policy on investments also has
been influenced by what the Company believes to be a long established
Congressional policy of encouraging employee ownership of stock in the
companies for which they work. This long standing Congressional policy is set
forth in Sections 402(a), 422 and 423 of the Internal Revenue Code.").
32 See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)-(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2000);
ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000).
33 See ERISA § 404(a)(2) (creating an exception to the fiduciary duty of
diversification for eligible individual account plans); id. §§ 406 (a)(2), 407(b)(1)
(creating an unlimited statutory exemption to the prohibition on plan asset
investment in "qualifying employer securities").
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In this new era where 401 (k) plans have replaced traditional retirement
plans as the dominant retirement plan,34 ERISA's carefully crafted and
limited support for employee ownership is removed from its historical
justification and inappropriately interjected into an employer's 401 (k) plan.
In this new context, ERISA's protectionist scheme fails to protect 401 (k)
plan participants' retirement security. As employers abandon their role as
the primary plan contributor that makes all of the plan's investment
decisions,35 ERISA's fiduciary standards do nothing to limit 401(k) plan
participants' ability to direct investment in any employer-selected invest-
ment alternative, including company stock.36 ERISA's fiduciary standards
also do little to limit plan fiduciaries' ability to offer company stock as a
401(k) plan investment alternative or direct employer contributions in the
form of company stock.37
Lacking consensus about the appropriate means to reform ERISA's
regime, pension reform slipped into virtual obscurity with the 2002 election
of a Republican majority to both houses of Congress. The only pension
34 See Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans, Hearing Before
the H.R. Subcomm. on Oversight for the Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong.
4 (2002) (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury, President and CEO of EBRI)
("[D]efmed benefit plans are on the decline and [401(k) plans] are becoming the
primary 'pension' plans in the nation.") [hereinafter Hearing on Retirement
Security]; Alicia H. Munnell et al., How Important are Private Pensions?, ISSUES
IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Retirement Research, Chestnut Hill, Mass.), Feb. 2002, at 6,
http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/issues/ib_8.pdf (discussing the shift from defined
benefit plans to individual account plans with a 401 (k) feature); Mitchell & Utkus,
supra note 4, at 2 (noting the continuing decline of defined benefit plans in terms
of number and coverage).
35 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., PRIVATE
PENSION PLAN BULLETIN No. 11: ABSTRACT OF 1998 FORM 5500 ANN. REP.
(Winter 2001-2002) Highlights from the 1998 Form 5500 Annual Reports (Winter
2001-2002), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1998pensionplanbulletin.pdf [hereinafter
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN] ("Oftotal employer and employee contributions
made to 401 (k) type plans, employees made 67%. For workers participating only
in a 401(k), employees contributed 63% of total contributions, and for workers
participating in both a 401(k) plan and another plan sponsored by their employer[,]
employees contributed 71%."); id. ("Seventy-nine percent of 401 (k) type plans,
covering 83% of the active participants, and holding 81% of the assets, provided
for participant direction of investments of either all assets or assets based on
employee contributions.").36 See infra text accompanying notes 94-100 (explaining that fiduciary duties
do not apply to ERISA § 404(c) plan participants).
37 See discussion infra Part I.B.2 (describing retained fiduciary duties).
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reform measure enacted into law was an ancillary measure addressing
insider trading during blackouts and blackout notification requirements,
which was included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 38 an act designed primarily
to address the accounting and corporate responsibility issues raised by the
Enron debacle. In spite of a deluge of more than twenty pension reform
bills that were introduced in Congress, 39 none was enacted into law.
The 108th Congress is showing signs of gearing up for yet another
round of pension reform debates with the House of Representatives'
reintroduction of the House-passed Pension Security Act of 2002,4" which
reflects the Bush Administration's pension reform proposals,4 and the
Senate Democratic Caucus' introduction of the Pension Protection and
Expansion Act of 2003 (the "Senate Finance Bill"). 42 With Congress's
current Republican majority, the reintroduced Pension Security Act of 2003
(the "House Bill") garners the broadest support and is the likely candidate
for pension reform.
The House Bill, however, rejects overall limitations on 401(k) plan
investment in company stock. Overall limitations could limit account asset
investment in company stock to a certain percentage of total account assets,
for example, 20% of a participant's account assets can be invested in
company stock. Alternatively, overall limitations could restrict the types of
contributions that can be made in the form of company stock, for example,
employer contributions or employee elective deferral contributions can be
38 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 306, 116 Stat. 745,
779-80 (2002) (passed by both houses of Congress on July 30, 2002).
39 H.R. 3463, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 3509; H.R. 3622; H.R. 3623; H.R.
3640; H.R. 3642; H.R. 3657; H.R. 3669; H.R. 3677; H.R. 3692; H.R. 3762; H.R.
3840; H.R. 3918; H.R. 2269; S. 1838, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1919; S. 1921; S.
1969; S. 1971; S. 1992; S. 2032; S. 2087; S. 1677.
40 H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002) (passed the full House on April 11, 2002 by
a vote of 255 to 163); Press Release, House Comm. on Ed. and the Workforce,
Workforce Committee Approves Bipartisan Pension Security Act (Mar. 6, 2003),
http://edworkforce.house.gov/press/press108/03mar/pension030603.htm (Mar. 6,
2003) (Pension Security Act of 2002 reintroduced as Pension Security Act of2003,
H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. (2003) and approved by the House Education & the
Workforce Committee on March 6, 2003).
41 See Press Release, Rep. John Boehner, Boehner, Johnson Announces Plans
to Reintroduce Pension Security Act (Jan. 7,2003), http://johnboehner.house.gov/
news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=601 [hereinafter Press Release, Plans to Reintro-
duce Pension Security Act].
42S.9, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill was referred to the Committee on Finance
on Jan. 7, 2003. Bill status available at http://www.thomas.loc.gov.
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made in the form of company stock, but not both. Instead, the House Bill
relies on ancillary pension reform measures that are being touted as the sine
qua non of pension plan reform, including a proposal giving participants
the ability to diversify company stock holdings,43 a proposal encouraging
voluntary employer-facilitated investment advice," and notification
proposals aimed at alerting participants of the importance of adequate plan
asset diversification.4 5
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the changing landscape
of voluntary, employer-sponsored retirement plans.46 This part details
ERISA's protectionist scheme as it relates to fiduciary standards and
prohibited transaction rules and how Congress designed this scheme within
the context of traditional retirement plans to support the dual federal policy
goals of retirement security and employee ownership. Part I also deals with
the fundamental shift away from traditional retirement plans and toward
401(k) plan dominance and how this fundamental shift has influenced
retirement plans by placing the employee ownership goal in employers'
primary retirement plans, eviscerating many of the fiduciary protections
once available to traditional individual account plan participants, and
resulting in a lack of adequate plan asset diversification.
Part II provides a critical analysis of the Republican-backed House
Bill's failure to implement overall limitations on 401 (k) plan investment in
company stock by analyzing the arguments against applying such limita-
tions.47 This part also provides a critical analysis of select ancillary pension
reform measures included in the House Bill and the blackout notification
requirements enacted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.48
Part III concludes that the House Bill is fatally flawed.4 9 The House Bill
fails to deliver ERISA's promise of a secure retirement because it rejects
overall limitations on 401 (k) plan investment in company stock and relies
on ancillary measures that cannot effectively accomplish sufficient plan
asset diversification. Specifically, meaningful pension reform must contain
overall limitations on 401 (k) plan investment in company stock, such as the
41 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. § 104.
44 Id. § 105.
41 Id. § 101 (b) (mandating additional dissemination of quarterly benefit state-
ments and investment education notices).
4See infra notes 51-209 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 210-78 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 279-338 and accompanying text; see also ERISA § 10 1(i),
29 U.S.C. § 102 1(i) (2002), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 306(b)(1).
49 See infra notes 339-50 and accompanying text.
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Senate Finance Bill "choice" proposal," which places a de facto limitation
on 401(k) plan company stock holdings by restricting the types of
contributions that can be made in the form of company stock. This
limitation is necessary to combat inherent employer influences over
participants' investment decisions. Meaningful pension reform must also
mandate the appointment of an independent fiduciary when employers offer
company stock as a 401(k) plan investment alternative. An independent
fiduciary is necessary to ensure that company stock remains a prudent
investment selection and that employers are not exerting improper
influences over participants' investment decisions. Finally, meaningful
pension reform must include the mandatory provision of independent,
individually-tailored investment advice as a cost of transferring investment
decisions to participants. This is necessary to ensure that participants are
provided with the tools to make educated investment decisions among
employer-selected investment alternatives.
I. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RETIREMENT PLANS
AND THE EVISCERATION OF ERISA'S PROTECTIONIST SCHEME
THROUGH A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT TO 401 (K) PLAN DOMINANCE
A. ERISA 'S Federal Legislative Regime Supporting the Dual Federal
Policy Goals of Retirement Security & Employee Ownership
Recognizing "that the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents"'" were being threatened by employer
abuses of the day, Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to provide a compre-
hensive federal regulatory scheme for voluntary employer-sponsored
retirement plans.52 Consistent with the federal government's fifty-year
history of supporting these voluntary arrangements,53 Congress designed
ERISA's statutory scheme to reflect two federal policy goals. The first and
primary goal of ERISA is to promote retirement security.54 Although the
50 S. 9, 108th Cong. § 104 (incorporating the Kennedy "choice proposal"
introduced in S. 1992, 107th Cong. § 102).
51 ERISA § 2(a) (2000).52 Id. § 2(b).
" For a review of major legislative acts and a brief history of retirement plans,
see EBRI, Facts from EBRI, History ofPension Plans (1998), http://www.ebri.org/
facts/0398afact.htm.54 ERISA of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829, preamble (1974) ("It
is hereby further declared to be the policy of this act to protect ... the interests of
participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the
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retirement security goal is present in both types of retirement plans,
historically, the goal is closely linked to defined benefit plans which
dominated the pre-ERISA retirement plan landscape.5 These plans provide
a fixed benefit and represent a quantifiable promise by employers to pay
participants a set sum annually during post-retirement years. 6 The
employer secures the promised benefit through contributions made to a
trust fund. Furthermore, to the extent that trust fund assets fail to provide
the promised benefit, the employer remains liable for any funding deficit. 7
The second federal policy goal is to promote employee ownership
through some level of retirement plan investment in company stock.5"
Historically, this goal is closely linked to the second type of retirement
plan, the individual account plan. Individual account plans provide benefits
based on contributions made to trust fund accounts established for each
plan participant.59 In contrast to defined benefit plans, individual account
plans do not guarantee a set amount. The only promised benefit is the
balance of the participant's individual account at the time the participant
is eligible to receive the account balance and thereafter requests a
distribution, with such account balance being determined by past contribu-
tions as adjusted for earnings and losses on account investments. 60
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the individual account plan universe
consisted almost entirely of employer-funded profit sharing plans and
employee stock ownership plans ("ESOP"), the latter designed to invest
primarily in qualifying employer securities. 6' These pre-ERISA individual
equitable character and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the
accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum
standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance.").
" See Leon E. Irish, Twenty Years of Employee Benefits, 1 J. PENSION PLAN
& COMPLIANCE 10-12 (1992) (noting that rising numbers of private pensions
established before 1970 followed growth of labor movement, typically
characterized by large defined benefit pension plans) (on file with author).
56 ERISA § 3(35) (defining "defined benefit plan").
17Id. §§ 302(b)(3), (c)(1 1), (d)(4).
'8 See supra note 31 (describing employee ownership goal in supplemental
individual account plans).
'9 ERISA § 3(34) (otherwise referred to as "defined contribution plans"); see
also I.R.C. §§ 414(i) & (j) (2000).
60 ERISA § 3(34).
6
,Id. § 407(c)(6) (defining an "employee stock ownership plan" as "an indivi-
dual account plan (A) which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock
bonus plan and money purchase plan both of which are qualified, under § 401 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and which is designed to invest primarily in
qualifying employer securities, and (B) which meets such other requirements as the
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account plans were supplemental plans not widely utilized as an employer's
primary retirement plan.62 Historically, these plans were funded by
employer contributions made in the form of company stock 63 and were
viewed by supporters of the employee ownership goal as an ideal vehicle
for promoting that federal policy.'
In the context of these dual federal policy goals, ERISA's regulatory
scheme contains fiduciary standards akin to those found under the common
law of trusts.65 Designed to address previously identified employer abuses,
including imprudent investment practices and excessive investments in
company stock,' the fiduciary standards help ensure that plan fiduciaries,
who are generally defined as persons who have any discretionary authority,
control, or responsibility with respect to the management and administra-
tion of an employee benefit plan,6 "discharge [their] duties ... solely in the
Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe by regulation.").
62 Hearing on Retirement Security, supra note 34, at 1 (statement of Dallas L.
Salisbury, President and CEO of EBRI) (At the time of ERISA's enactment,
"[e]ssentially all of the nation's largest employers had a defined benefit plan and
a thrift-saving or profit-sharing plan .... ").
63 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 3-4 (explaining that defined
contribution "plans consisted mainly of profit-sharing plans to which employers
made variable plan contributions based on company earning, and [ESOPs] which
by design encouraged employers to make employer stock contributions in an effort
to foster employee ownership. DC plans were thus not widely used as a retirement
income vehicles [sic] and at many large firms, they were supplemental to DB
programs").
64Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 48 (statement of Elaine L.
Chao, Secretary, United States Department of Labor) ("Congress viewed individual
account plans as having a different purpose from than [sic] defined benefit plans.
Also, Congress noted that these plans had traditionally invested in company
securities.").65 See Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp. Inc., 472
U.S. 559, 570 n.10 (1985) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 29 (1973), 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 832) 4639,4865) ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in
essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles
developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.").
66 See 120 CONG. REc. S15,738-15,741 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,5186-87 (statement of Sen. Williams). For a discussion of the
legislative history of ERISA, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION & EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 62-96 (3d ed. 2000).
67 ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(21) (2003). ERISA defines fiduciary
to include any person who either:
(i) ... exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
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interest of [plan] participants."6 Plan fiduciaries that breach these duties
are personally liable for any gains derived by the fiduciary or for any losses
incurred by the plan.69 Furthermore, plan fiduciaries may even be liable for
the misconduct of co-fiduciaries where the former's actions either
contributed to the breach of duties or tacitly enabled the latter to breach
their duties.70
Of ERISA's four general fiduciary standards,71 three directly impact
retirement plan investment decisions: the duties of loyalty, prudence, and
diversification.72 Under the duty of loyalty standard, plan fiduciaries must
discharge their duties for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and defraying reasonable administrative costs of the plan.73
Courts interpret this duty to mean that plan fiduciaries must act "with an
respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) .. .renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to any moneys or other. property of such plan, or (iii) ... has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration
of such plan.
Id. 68I d. § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2003).
69 See id. § 409.
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries...
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by
the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate....
Id.
70 Id. § 405(a). Under the co-fiduciary provisions, one fiduciary is liable for a
breach by a second fiduciary under the following circumstances:
(1) if the first fiduciary "participates knowingly in, or knowingly
undertakes to conceal, an act or omission" of the second fiduciary,
knowing that the second fiduciary is violating his fiduciary duties; (2) if
the first fiduciary's failure to discharge his own fiduciary duties enables
the second fiduciary to commit a breach; or (3) if the first fiduciary knows
of a breach by the second fiduciary and fails to make reasonable efforts
to remedy the breach.
Id.
7'Id. § 404(a)(I)(A)-(D).
72 See id. § 404(a)(1)(A)-(C).
73Id. § 404(a)(1)(A).
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eye single to the interests of the participants 74 and cannot place others'
interests above participants' interests. 5
Under the duty of prudence standard, plan fiduciaries must act with the
"care, skill, prudence and diligence" that a prudent person familiar with
such matters would use in similar circumstances.76 This duty of prudence
dictates that plan fiduciaries responsible for investment decisions have
sufficient expertise and familiarity with investment matters to make
educated investment decisions.77
Under the duty of diversification standard, a cornerstone principle of
prudent investment practices,78 plan fiduciaries must generally diversify
plan investments in order to minimize the risks associated with specific
investments.79 While imposing no quantifiable limit on the degree of
investment concentration, ERISA conference committee reports indicate
that plan investment decisions, including diversification decisions, must be
made based on all of the facts and circumstances then available to plan
fiduciaries, including an evaluation of the firm-specific and industry-
specific risks of each investment.80
ERISA also established prohibited transaction rules" to counter per-
ceived abuses of the time. 2 Designed to eliminate self-dealing transactions
that benefit plan fiduciaries and other interested parties at the participants'
" Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 125 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Donovan v.
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also Sandoval v. Simmons, 622
F. Supp. 1174, 1212 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
7" See, e.g., Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 278 (3d Cir. 1995); Trenton v.
Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987); Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
694 F. Supp 624 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding that a fiduciary under ERISA had a duty
of complete and undivided loyalty to participants and beneficiaries).
76 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).
77 See, e.g., Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983); In
re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 150-53 (3d Cir. 1999).
78 Bodie & Crane, supra note 2, at 5.79ERISA § 404(a)(1 )(C) ("by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so").
80 H.R. Conf. Rpt. 93-1280 (Aug. 12, 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5084-5085. For an analysis of the diversification requirement, see, for
example, Reich v. King, 861 F. Supp. 379, 383 (D. Md. 1994); In re Unisys Sav.
Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir. 1996); Brock v. Citizens Bank of Clovis,
1985 WL 71535 *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 20, 1985).
81 ERISA § 406.
82 120 CONG. REc. § 15737 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4650-51.
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expense,83 the prohibited transaction rules restrict a plan fiduciary's ability
to direct investment in employer securities, including company stock,'
without qualifying for a statutory exemption or seeking an administrative
exemption from the Department of Labor ("DOL").85 Plan fiduciaries, and
certain non-fiduciary "parties in interest, ' 86 that enter into unauthorized
prohibited transactions are personally liable to the plan for any resulting
losses.8 7
While these standards and rules apply to both types of retirement plans,
ERISA contains three primary modifications that impact plan asset invest-
ment decisions in the context of company stock holdings. First, to accom-
modate Congress' support of the employee ownership goal in supplemental
individual account plans, ERISA creates an exception to the fiduciary duty
of diversification for "eligible individual account plans," such as profit
sharing plans and ESOPs.88 Theoretically, this exception allows plan
fiduciaries to invest up to 100% of eligible individual account plan assets
in "qualifying employer securities," including company stock.89
In its historical context, where plan fiduciaries retain authority for
investment decisions, the eligible individual account plan modification to
the fiduciary duty of diversification came with a price. Under the remaining
fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence, plan fiduciaries are required to
make prudent investment decisions consistent with professional guide-
lines in the field of finance and investment.9" These guidelines establish
83 id.
84 ERISA § 406(a)(1)(E); see also id. § 407(d)(1).
851 d. §§ 406(a)(1)(E), 408.
86 ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (2003) (defining "party in interest"
to include plan fiduciaries and persons providing services to the plan).
17 ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2003); ERISA § 502(i); see also
Harris Trust & Savs. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 239
(2000) (recognizing a cause of action against nonfiduciaries who participate in a
prohibited transaction, but limiting relief to "appropriate equitable relief' under
ERISA Section 502(a)(3)).
18 See ERISA §§ 404(a)(2), 407(d)(3)(A)-(C) (defining "eligible individual
account plan" to include a profit sharing, stock bonus or savings plan, employee
stock ownership plan, and certain pre-ERISA money purchase plans that explicitly
provide for the acquisition and holding of qualifying employer securities and are
not part of a defined benefit plan floor-offset arrangement).
89 Id. § 404(a)(2).
90 Id. (exempting the prudence requirement "only to the extent that it requires
diversification" and leaving the fiduciary duty of loyalty in tact).
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the status quo as a well-diversified investment portfolio9' and indicate
that investing more than 10 to 20% of plan assets in a single investment
may be imprudent. 92 Thus, these professional guidelines preclude eligible
individual account plan fiduciaries from imprudently attaining an exces-
sive concentration in any one investment, including employer company
stock.93
Second, ERISA permits plan fiduciaries to transfer individual account
plan investment decisions to participants ("ERISA Section 404(c) plans"). 94
Although ERISA's legislative history does not explain the policy rationale
supporting this modification, it appears the modification was created, in
part, to accommodate pre-ERISA thrift savings plans, the precursor to
today's 401 (k) plan. Thrift savings plans provide for employee contribu-
tions made on an after-tax basis and are usually part of an employer's profit
sharing plan.95 Arguably, Congress believed participants should be given
the ability to direct the investment of employee after-tax contributions,
which are not tax-subsidized contributions and belong solely to partici-
pants. ERISA Section 404(c), however, is broader in application and allows
plan fiduciaries to transfer all individual account plan investment decisions
to participants.96
Under this second modification, ERISA Section 404(c) plan fiduciaries
are not liable for any loss or breach of fiduciary duty that is the result of
participants' independent investment decisions.97 Absent this protection,
plan fiduciaries might be held liable for participants' imprudent investment
decisions, even educated and informed ones.98 Further, ERISA Section
404(c) provides that participants who direct the investment of their account
assets will not be considered plan fiduciaries. 99 Thus, ERISA Section
9' See Lisa Meulbroek, Company Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly Is It?
9 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 02-058, 2002), http://www.hbs.edu/
research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers2/0102/02-058.pdf; Bodie & Crane, supra
note 2.
92 Purcell, Employer Stock in Retirement Plans, supra note 27, at 10 (noting
that many advisors recommend a 10% to 20% limit as the maximum exposure to
a single firm's securities).
93 See supra note 90.
94 ERISA § 404(c).
9' See Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C.B. 130 (1974).
96 ERISA § 404(c).97 Id. § 404(c)(1)(B).
98 id.
99 Id. § 404(c)(1)(A).
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404(c) plan participants are not subject to ERISA's fiduciary duties,
including the duty of prudence that dictates safe investment practices.' 0
Third, to accommodate Congress' limited support of the goal of
employee ownership in traditional retirement plans, ERISA creates an
exception under the prohibited transaction rules for plan asset investment
in "qualifying employer securities."'0 1 ERISA severely limits this exception
for defined benefit plans. Based upon their close relationship to ERISA's
retirement security goal, defined benefit plans are restricted from investing
more than 10% of plan assets in qualifying employer securities," 2 and then
only if holding these assets otherwise meets ERISA's fiduciary standards
of loyalty, prudence and diversification.0 3 Consistent with the then
supplemental status of individual account plans, and the employee owner-
10 Id.
101 Id. §§ 407(a)(2), 407(b)(1). Section 407(d)(5) defines a "qualifying em-
ployer security" to mean only: (1) publicly traded common stock of the employer
or a member of the same controlled group of corporations; (2) if there is no
publicly traded common stock, common stock of the employer (or member of the
same controlled group of corporations) that has both voting power and dividend
rights at least as great as any other class of common stock; or (3) noncallable
preferred stock that is convertible into common stock described in (1) or (2) and
that meets certain requirements and that is held only by an ESOP. But see id. §
407(f)(1). After December 17, 1987, employer stock is considered a qualifying
employer security only if the plan is an eligible individual account plan or, in the
case of defined benefit plans, the security meets certain definitional requirements
established under ERISA section 407(f)(1), which generally provides that no more
than 25% of the outstanding stock of the same class is owned by the plan and at
least 50% of the outstanding stock of the same class is owned by persons
independent of the employer. Id. § 407(f)(2).
'
02 d. § 407(a)(2).
103 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5037, 5085.
If securities are qualifying employer securities they generally can be
acquired or held notwithstanding the prohibited transaction rules, if
acquisition is for adequate consideration and no commission is charged
and if acquisition is allowed by the employer securities rules. However
.. acquisition and holding of these assets must also meet the rules of
prudence, diversification, etc. Therefore, if the diversification and
prudence rules require that less than 10 percent of plan assets are to be
held in employer securities and employer real property, the lower limit is
to govern.
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ship goal promoted by these plans, 114 eligible individual account plan
investment in qualifying employer securities is not subject to any percent-
age limitation." 5 It is, however, theoretically limited by the fiduciary
standards of loyalty and prudence.'06
B. The Proliferation of 401(k) Plans and the Evisceration of ERISA's
Protectionist Scheme
Beginning in the late 1970s, the retirement plan universe began a
dramatic shift away from traditional retirement plans toward participant-
directed individual account plans.'0 7 The primary impetus for this shift
occurred in 1978, when Congress created the 401 (k) plan.0 8 These plans
authorize employer sponsorship of an individual account plan providing
participants with the opportunity to defer a part of their compensation on
a pre-tax basis.'0 9 With their employee elective deferral contribution
feature, 401(k) plans transformed individual account plans from their
historical status as the receptacles of corporate profits to the receptacles of
employee contributions." 0
"o See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 3 ("Many prominent employers
viewed DC plans as vehicles for promoting employee stock ownership and so they
objected to limitations on company stock holdings." (citation omitted)).
10S ERISA § 407(b)(1). But see id. § 407(d)(3)(A) (Money purchase pension
plans, which may qualify as "eligible individual account plans" if the former was
established prior to the enactment of ERISA.).
106 Canale v. Yegen, 782 F. Supp. 963, 967 (D.N.J. 1992) ("This provision
does not mean that failure to diversify pension assets invested in employer
securities can never constitute a breach of ERISA fiduciary duties."); McKinnon
v. Cairns, 698 F. Supp. 852, 862 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
107 PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, supra note 35, at 64, tbl.E 1 (stating that
in 1979, employers sponsored 139,489 defined benefit plans and 331,432
individual account plans, compared to 1998 with employers sponsoring 56,405
defined benefit plans and 673,626 individual account plans).
'08 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 40 1(k) (2003)); see also PRIVATE PENSION PLAN
BULLETIN, supra note 35, at 2 ("Paralleling the decline in [defined benefits] plan
coverage has been a decline in coverage under DC [defined benefits] plans without
a 401(k) plan feature. Most of this decline resulted from the adoption of a 401(k)
feature by ongoing DC plans.").
109 See supra note 108.
"0 PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, supra note 35, at 3 ("Of total employee
contributions made to 401(k) type plans, employees made 67%. For workers
participating only in a 401(k), employees contributed 63% of total contributions,
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The secondary impetus for this fundamental shift occurred in 1992,
with the DOL's promulgation of ERISA Section 404(c) regulations."' This
regulatory guidance, issued eighteen years after the creation of ERISA
Section 404(c) plans, outlines how employers can effectively transfer
control over investment decisions, and the corresponding risk of those
decisions, to participants.' 12
Relieved of significant funding liabilities and regulatory uncertainties,
employers embraced 401(k) plans designed as ERISA Section 404(c)
plans."'3 Since the creation of 401 (k) plans, they have become the dominant
retirement plan with 41% of all plans designed as 401 (k) plans and 51% of
all active participants covered under these plans." 4 These figures translate
into over forty-two million American workers participating in over 300,000
employer-sponsored 401 (k) plans.' Further, in a little more than ten years
since the DOL promulgated ERISA Section 404(c) regulations, the vast
majority of 401(k) plans are now designed as ERISA Section 404(c) plans
("participant-directed 401 (k) plans")." 6
The following sub-part addresses how this fundamental shift affects
401(k) plan participants employed by large publicly traded companies,
which are more likely to offer a company stock investment alternative.
Specifically, it looks at how the interplay between 401(k) plans and
traditional retirement plans potentiallyjeopardizes participants' retirement
security, how the proliferation of 401 (k) plans dilutes ERISA's fiduciary
protectionist scheme, and how employers are ineffectively transferring
and for workers participating in both a 401(k) plan and another plan sponsored by
their employer[,] employees contributed 71%.").
"' ERISA Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility, 29 C.F.R. §
2550.404c-1 (2003).
2 Id. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2).
"3 Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 469,477-78 (2001) [hereinafter Medill, Stock Market Volatility and
401(k) Plans].
"' PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, supra note 35, at 2.
"1
5 See id. at 47, tbl.D3 (300,593 401(k) type plans); Hearing on Protecting the
Pensions of Working Americans: Lessons From the Enron Debacle: Before the
Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab. and Pensions, 107th Cong. 3 (2002) (statement
of Dallas L. Salisbury, President and CEO, Employee Benefit Research).
116 See PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, supra note 35, at 3 (estimating that
approximately "79 percent of all 401(k) type plans, covering 83 [percent] of the
active participants, and holding 81 [percent] of the assets, provided for participant
direction of investments of either all assets or assets based on employee
contributions").
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investment decisions to plan participants who are incapable of making
prudent investment selections.
1. The Interplay Between 401(k) Plans and
Traditional Retirement Plans
There are several deleterious effects that flow from 401(k) plan
dominance, the most important of which is the current interaction between
401 (k) plans and traditional retirement plans. With respect to traditional
defined benefit plan sponsorship, DOL statistics indicate that, between
1983 and 1998, sponsorship of large defined benefit plans decreased by
41.7%, which resulted in approximately six million fewer active large
defined benefit plan participants.'17 Companies such as Procter & Gamble,
Home Depot, McDonald's, and Dell Computer do not sponsor defined
benefit plans, but instead, sponsor 401 (k) plans for their employees." 8
Even with respect to those large, publicly traded companies that are the
stalwarts of defined benefit plan sponsorship,1 9 employer sponsorship of
a 401(k) plan negatively impacts an employer's defined benefit plan
sponsorship. In reviewing data collected from 827 companies over a
fourteen-year period, Dr. Teresa Ghilarducci found that employer
sponsorship of a 401(k) plan reduced an employer's defined benefit plan
.. See id. at 66, tbl.E3 (showing that between 1983 and 1998, the number of
large defined benefit plans fell from25,979 to 15,141, or4l.7%); id. at 74, tbl.El0
(showing that between 1983 and 1998, number of active participants in large
defined benefit plans fell from approximately twenty-eight million to twenty-two
million).
'18 See Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement
Plans, supra note 8, at 4.
119 See Hearings on Enron and Beyond Enhancing Worker Retirement
Security Hearing Before Comm. onEduc. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 107-44
(2002), 2002 WL 227987 [hereinafter Hearings on Enron and Beyond Enhancing
Worker Retirement Security] (testimony of Dr. Douglas Kruse, Professor, School
of Management & Labor Relations, Rutgers University) ("About 70-75% of
participants in plans that are heavily invested in employer stock are in companies
that also maintain diversified pension plans, indicating that such plans tend to
supplement rather than substitute for diversified plans."); EBRI Special Report:
Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, supra note 8, at 8 (finding that employers who
sponsor a defined benefit plan are more likely to provide a company stock
investment alternative under their 401 (k) plan and make employer contributions in
the form of company stock, and thereby have a heavier concentration of company
stock in their 401 (k) plan).
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costs "by almost one third."'' 20 This translates into a reduction of benefits
provided under the defined benefit plan. Further, employer sponsorship of
a 401 (k) plan increases the likelihood that an employer will freeze the level
of benefits offered under a defined benefit plan or terminate an existing
defined benefit plan. A 1996 study commissioned by the DOL found that,
for employers sponsoring large defined benefit plans, the addition of a
401 (k) plan increased the probability of a defined benefit plan termination
from 17% to 35%.121
With respect to traditional individual account plan sponsorship, 401 (k)
plans are now being integrated into employers' once supplemental stand-
alone ESOPs. One of the driving forces behind this integration is a recent
change enacted under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA"). 122 Prior to 2002, C corporations were permitted
a dividend deduction for cash dividends paid on ESOP company stock
holdings if the dividends were generally distributed to ESOP participants.1
23
To encourage asset accumulation and dividend reinvestment, few employ-
12 Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 206 (testimony of Teresa
Ghilarducci, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of
Notre Dame).
121 LESLIE E. PAPKE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS
ADMINISTRATION, DOES 401(K) INTRODUCTION AFFECT DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS?
2 (SP-95-010) (July 11, 1996), http://www.DOL.gov/ebsa/programs/opr/P-RES/
papke.htm ("[I]f a 401(k) plan is added by a sponsor, the [defined benefit plan]
termination probability increases by about 18 percentage points to 35 percent.")
(utilizing data from the 1985 and 1992 Form 5500 filings available from the
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration of the U.S. DOL, which examined
a sample of approximately 16,500 defined benefit plans and 11,900 sponsors,
author determined that employer sponsorship of individual account plans
negatively impacted their continued sponsorship of previously established defined
benefit plans, including: between 1985 and 1992, 20% of employers terminated
their defined benefit plans and either retained or added an individual account plan;
defined benefit plan offerings were reduced when employer adopts an individual
account plan, with a sponsor terminating a defined benefit plan for approximately
every three sponsors that offer at least one new 401(k) plan; the introduction of a
non-40 1(k) individual account plan reduces defined benefit plan offerings). Id.
122 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
123 I.R.C. § 404(k)(2)(A) (2001) (defining "applicable dividend" where
deductions are either: "(i) ... paid in cash to the participants ... ; (ii)... paid to
the plan and distributed in cash to participants... [within] 90 days after the close
of the plan year... ; or (iii)... used to make payments on a loan secured to buy
ESOP company stock.").
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ers took advantage of the dividend deduction and instead retained those
dividends as plan assets. As a result of a change enacted under EGTRRA,
C corporations can now take a dividend deduction when plan participants
are given the option of reinvesting the dividends in company stock or taking
cash distributions.1 4 Thus, employers can now claim a dividend deduction
on ESOP company stock holdings even when the dividend is not immedi-
ately distributable to participants.
This small change in the corporate tax law altered ESOP/401 (k) plan
design. To qualify for the dividend deduction, the dividends must be paid
to an ESOP. This leaves company stock holding in non-ESOPs ineligible
for the dividend deduction. To overcome this problem and maximize the
potential dividend deduction, many large publicly traded companies are
converting their 401 (k) plans into hybrid plans with an ESOP component
and a 401 (k) component, referred to as KSOPs. Company stock can be held
under the ESOP component of the plan, and all other investment selections
can be held under the 401(k) component of the plan.125 The dividend
deduction is then available for all company stock held by the KSOP.
This hybrid structure translates into millions of dollars in tax savings
for large publicly traded companies126 and serves as a strong incentive for
401(k) plan conversion. Recent estimates indicate that about 4.8 million
American workers (more than 10% of the 401(k) plan population)
participate in large 401(k) plans designed as KSOPs.127 In many cases, the
401 (k) component of these plans, which once held both employee elective
deferral contributions and employer contributions, is stripped down to a
receptacle for employee elective deferral contributions directed to
investment alternatives other than company stock. Further, the hybrid
KSOP is transformed into a plan that primarily invests in company
stock--an unintended result of EGTRRA.
12 4 Id. § 404(k)(2)(A)(iii) (2002) (as amended by Section 662(a) of Pub. L. No.
107-16); see also I.R.S. Notice 2002-2, 2002-2 I.R.B. 285 (Jan. 14, 2002).
125 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200237026 (Sept. 13, 2002) (issuing a favorable ruling
for a hybrid 401(k)/ESOP).
126 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 37, tbl.3 (estimating the ESOP
deduction under EGTRRA in the millions for numerous publicly traded companies)
(citing Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Companies' Hot Tax Break.- 401(k)s,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2002, at C I).
127 Hearings on Enron and Beyond Enhancing Worker Retirement Security,
supra note 119 (testimony of Dr. Douglas Kruse, Professor, School of
Management & Labor Relations, Rutgers University) (Referencing the Form 5500
database for large plans, Professor Kruse stated: "[T]here are about 3.2 million
participants in large non-401 (k) ESOPs, and 4.8 million participants in large 401 (k)
ESOPs.").
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2. Effect of 401(k) Plans on
ERISA 's Fiduciary Protectionist Scheme
In adopting participant-directed 401(k) plans, first in the context of
supplemental plans, and later in lieu of traditional retirement plans,
employers shift much of the funding obligation'28 and the investment
obligation 29 to participants. At the same time, the liability for investing
employee elective deferral contributions is divorced from ERISA's
fiduciary standards. The fiduciary duty protections afforded to traditional
individual account plan participants apply only to the extent that plan
fiduciaries continue to make investment decisions, "such as where plan
fiduciaries make employer matching contributions in the form of company
stock or where participants fail to direct account investments."'30 For all
participant-directed investment decisions, to the extent that plan fiduciaries
operate the plan in compliance with ERISA Section 404(c) requirements,'
plan fiduciaries are relieved of liability for any loss or for any breach of
fiduciary duty that is the direct and necessary result of participants'
independent investment decisions.'32
While ERISA Section 404(c)'s fiduciary liability relief does not
completely insulate plan fiduciaries from all liability for participant-
directed investments, the remaining protections are ill-defined and subject
to a broad facts and circumstances analysis. The retained fiduciary duties
of loyalty and prudence require plan fiduciaries to prudently select plan
investment alternatives and to continuously monitor the performance of
128 See PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN, supra note 35, at 2.
129 id.
130 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(1) (2003) (ERISA Section 404(c) applies
"only with respect to a transaction where a participant or beneficiary has exercised
independent control in fact with respect to the investment of assets in his individual
account.").
131 See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress 'Misguided
Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 361, 373-76 (2002) [hereinafter Stabile, Freedom to Choose
Unwisely] (providing a complete analysis of how an ERISA § 404(c) plan fiduciary
complies with ERISA § 404(c) regulatory requirements and effectively transfers
control over plan investment decisions to plan participants).
132 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2) (stating that "no other person who is a
fiduciary with respect to such plan shall be liable for any loss, or with respect to
any breach ... that is the direct and necessary result of that participant's or
beneficiary's exercise of control").
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those investment alternatives. 33 This retained duty also applies to co-
fiduciaries that are not directly responsible for selecting and monitoring
investment alternatives where the co-fiduciary's actions enable other plan
fiduciaries to imprudently select or monitor investment alternatives.3
4
According to the DOL, this retained duty "do[es] not permit fiduciaries to
ignore grave risks to plan assets, stand idly by while participants' retire-
ment security is destroyed, and then blithely assert that they had no
responsibility for the resulting harm." '135
Another area of fiduciary liability arises from an ERISA Section 404(c)
plan fiduciaries' representations to participants. Under the fiduciary duty
of loyalty, plan fiduciaries cannot materially mislead participants.'36 This
' ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000); 29 C.F.R. §
2550.404c-1 (a)(2), (f)(8); 57 Fed. Reg. 46,924 n.27; see also Hunt v. Magnell, 758
F. Supp. 1292, 1299 (D. Minn. 1991) (explaining that "a trustee's fiduciary
responsibilities with respect to an investment do not terminate upon the conclusion
of preliminary investigation and purchase of the asset. ERISA fiduciaries must
monitor investments with reasonable diligence and dispose of investments which
are improper to keep" (citations omitted)).
"14 ERISA § 405(a); Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 901 F.2d 404, 422-23
(5th Cir. 1990); American Fed'n of Unions Local 102 v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the United States, 841 F.2d 658, 665 (5th Cir. 1988).
"' Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae Secretary of Labor at 2, Tittle v. Enron
Corp., Civil Action No. H-01-3913, http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/enron
brief-8-30-02.htm (Aug. 30,2002) [hereinafter Amended BriefofAmicus Curiae].
'
36 d. at 15 (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) ("[L]ying
is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in
section 404(a)(1) of ERISA.")); see also Becker v. Eastman Kodak Co., 120 F.3d
5, 9 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that because summary plan description and benefits
counselor's advice together amounted to materially misleading information, the
fiduciary breached its duty to provide participants with complete and accurate
information); Babcock v. Hartmarx Corp., No. 96-3862, 1997 WL 767658, at *3
(E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 182 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 1999)
("[D]efendant's silence, inaction and misleading advices [sic] constitute a breach
of the defendant's fiduciary duty."); Simeon v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 150 F.
Supp. 2d 598, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[A] fiduciary may not materially mislead
those to whom the duties of loyalty and prudence . . . are owed (ERISA was
enacted, in part, to ensure that employees receive sufficient information about their
rights under employee benefit plans to make well-informed employment and
retirement decisions).") (citations omitted); In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc.,
241 B.R. 76, 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("A misrepresentation is material 'if there
is a substantial likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in making
an adequately informed retirement decision.' "(quoting In re Unisys Corp. Retiree
Med. Benefit ERISA Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995)).
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duty of loyalty also places an affirmative duty on plan fiduciaries to
disclose material information necessary to protect participants against
threats to plan assets.137 In the context of company stock investments,
however, this retained duty is tempered by existing federal securities
laws, "'38 which restrict dissemination of nonpublic information and may
preclude plan fiduciaries from communicating company financial troubles
to participants. 3 9
ERISA Section 404(c) plan fiduciaries also retain a duty with respect
to the design and implementation of blackout periods. ERISA Section
404(c) regulations indicate that fiduciary liability relief is only available
during the time participants are capable of exercising control over their
account assets. 4° During any period in which participants' investment
ability is restricted or suspended, other than reasonable restrictions placed
on the frequency of investment directions,"' participants are incapable of
exercising control over their accounts.1
42
Enron 401(k) Plan participants are among the first to seek damages
based on these retained fiduciary duties. 4 3 Enron 401 (k) Plan participants
1 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(c)(2)(ii) (providing that ERISA Section 404(c)
fiduciary liability relief is not available where plan fiduciaries have concealed
material information regarding the investment, unless disclosure of such
information would violate any provision of federal law or any provision of state
law that is not preempted by ERISA); McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co.,
60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Section 404(a) imposes on a fiduciary the duty
of undivided loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries, as well as a duty to
exercise care, skill, prudence and diligence. An obvious component of those
responsibilities is the duty to disclose material information.").
13 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(c)(2)(ii).
9 Id. But see Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 135, at 25-27.
DOL argues that this duty is not inconsistent with securities laws, in that the cor-
porate insiders owed a fiduciary duty to disclose material nonpublic information
to the shareholders and trading public. Conversely, the DOL argues that Enron plan
fiduciaries could have met this duty by eliminating Enron stock as a plan
investment alternative and as an employer matching contribution or alerting
"regulatory agencies, such as the SEC and the Department of Labor, to the
misstatements." Id.
"4 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(a)(1).
'4 Id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(C).
14 2 Id. See also Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, supra note
113, at 535-43, for a complete analysis of the potential remedies available under
ERISA for 401 (k) plan participants injured by their employer's breach of fiduciary
duty.
143 See Kathleen Pender, Lawsuits Put Pressure on Companies to Change
401(k) Plan Rules, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2002, at B1 ("Employees and former
employees of Enron, Lucent Technologies, Ikon Office Solutions, Nortel Networks
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filed several lawsuits against Enron, its employee benefits administrative
committee, company executives, and Enron's third-party service
providers.' The Enron class action plaintiffs appear to have a strong case
of fiduciary liability given the facts that plan fiduciaries were aware of
nonpublic information that raised doubts about the continued viability of
an Enron company stock investment alternative,' 45 and despite that
awareness, they continued to offer the Enron company stock investment
alternative, continued to promote Enron company stock ownership, and
implemented the scheduled blackout at a time when Enron company stock
was in a virtual free fall.
46
There are, however, numerous reasons why the retained fiduciary
duties may not provide adequate protection to Enron 401 (k) Plan partici-
pants, as well as to any participant-directed 401 (k) plan participants. First,
once an employer establishes that a plan qualifies as an ERISA Section
404(c) plan, 47 the burden falls on participants to show that plan fiduciaries
breached one or more of their retained fiduciary duties.'48 This burden is ill-
defined. To date, only two appellate courts have considered fiduciary
liability stemming from a plan fiduciary's failure to prudently select and
monitor a company stock investment alternative; in both cases, the plans at
issue were ESOPs. 149 Both courts held that the objective of encouraging
employee stock ownership was secondary to ERISA's objectives of
and Providian have filed suits alleging breach of fiduciary dut[ies] in their 401 (k)
plans. All the suits revolve around losses in company stock.").
" Consolidated Amended Complaint, Tittle v. Enron Corp. (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(No. H-01-3913), http://www.enronerisa.com/pdf/Enron1stConsolidatedAmended
Complaint.pdf.
"' See Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 116-18 (statement of
Cindy K. Olson, Executive Vice President of Human Resources and Community
Relations) (indicating that she was aware of the Sherron Watkins memo, that she
met with Ms. Watkins, and arranged a meeting between Ms. Watkins and Mr. Lay).
146 Id. at 104 (statement of Mike Rath, Benefits Manager, Enron Corporation).
Rath indicated that Enron plan fiduciaries did consider postponing the eleven-day
blackout period based on concerns respecting financial statement disclosures, but
determined that more than 20,000 plan participants could not be notified in a timely
fashion and, in any event, "would actually take longer to reverse the transition than
to finish it." Id.
141 Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely, supra note 131, at 373-76.
1481 d.; see also Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, supra note
113, at 481-82.
149 Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995); Kuper v. lovenko, 66
F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Canale v. Yegan, 782 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.J.
1992).
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"ensuring the proper management and soundness of employee benefit
plans."' 50 To accommodate these competing objectives, however, the courts
held that there is a presumption that an ESOP fiduciary's investment in
company stock complies with ERISA. 5' To rebut that presumption, a
plaintiff must show that the plan fiduciary's continued investment in
company stock constitutes an abuse of discretion. 5 2 The application of this
"abuse of discretion" standard is unclear, but both courts indicated that
factors such as a rapid decline in the price of company stock, 5 3 plan
fiduciary knowledge of the imminent financial collapse of the employer,'
and the presence of a conflict of interest generated by the plan fiduciary's
dual role as a fiduciary and company insider are important considerations
in the analysis.'55
The abuse of discretion standard may be applied to participant-directed
401(k) plans with company stock holdings. While there are policy and
design distinctions between ESOPs and 401 (k) plans (e.g., the latter is not
historically designed for investment primarily in company stock), there is
no statutory basis for distinguishing between an ESOP and any other
eligible individual account plan with respect to the deference paid to a plan
sponsor's selection of a company stock investment alternative. Therefore,
courts may ignore the policy and design distinctions between the two plans
0 Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1457; see also Moench, 62 F.3d at 569 ("ESOP fidu-
ciaries must, then, wear two hats, and are 'expected to administer ESOP invest-
ments consistent with the provisions of both a specific employee benefits plan and
ERISA."' (quoting Kuper v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 1389, 1395
(S.D. Ohio 1994))).
... Moench, 62 F.3d at 567-68 ("ESOP plans are formulated with the primary
purpose of investing in employer securities" and that"under normal circumstances,
ESOP fiduciaries cannot be taken to task for failing to diversify investments,
regardless of how prudent diversification would be under the terms of an ordinary
non-ESOP pension plan.").
'
52 Id. at 571 ("[A]n ESOP fiduciary who invests the assets in employer stock
is entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently with ERISA by virtue of that
decision. However, the plaintiff may overcome that presumption by establishing
that the fiduciary abused its discretion by investing in employer securities.").
'
53 Id. at 572.
154 id.
'55 Id. ("[C]ourts should be cognizant that as the financial state of the company
deteriorates, ESOP fiduciaries who double as directors of the corporation often
begin to serve two masters."); Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1459 (holding that ESOP plan
fiduciaries did not consider diversification "despite their intimate knowledge of
[the company's] financial woes and their awareness that the [the company's CEO]
sold his shares [in the company]").
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and apply the abuse of discretion standard to 401(k) plan fiduciaries'
selection and retention of a company stock investment alternative.
Alternatively, even if courts accept that the distinction between 40 1(k)
plans and ESOPs warrants different standards of review, the distinction
may be eradicated by employers' conversion of 401(k) plans to KSOPs,
under which company stock holdings are held under the ESOP component
of the plan (which is designed to invest primarily in company stock and
warrants the abuse of discretion standard). While the Enron 401(k) Plan
was not designed as a hybrid KSOP, this distinction will not exist for
millions of other 401(k) plan participants. Given the lack of a statutory
distinction and the proliferation of hybrid KSOPs, 40 1 (k) plan participants
may carry a heavy burden of showing that plan fiduciaries abused their
discretion-that they knew or should have known that company stock was
an imprudent investment offering."5 6
A second reason why the retained fiduciary duties may not provide
adequate protection to Enron 401(k) participants is that appellate court
decisions have accepted an ERISA Section 404(c) defense argument. This
allows plan fiduciaries to escape liability where losses stem from partici-
pants' independent investment decisions even when they breach their
fiduciary liabilities to prudently select and monitor investment
alternatives.' 57 In effect, an ERISA Section 404(c) plan fiduciary may be
able to insulate herself from fiduciary liability by establishing that there
was a "causal nexus between the participant's exercise of control and the
claimed loss," '58 and thus, the plan fiduciary's selection of the company
stock investment alternative was not the proximate cause of the partici-
pants' losses. 59
156 See Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer
Securities, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 563-64 (2002) (noting a recent decision
by the U.S. District Court of Pennsylvannia in In re Ikon Office Solutions
Securities Litigation, 191 F.R.D. 457, 462 (E.D. Pa. 2000), "[t]he Ikon decision
suggests that courts will examine a 401(k) plan fiduciary's decision to continue to
invest matching contributions in company stock the same way the decision of an
ESOP trustee is analyzed").
"' In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
ERISA Section 404(c) "allows a fiduciary, who is shown to have committed a
breach of duty in making an investment decision, to argue that despite the breach,
it may not be held liable because the alleged loss resulted from a participant's
exercise of control").
1' Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely, supra note 131, at 377.
159 But see 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 (Oct. 13, 1992). In footnote 27 of the
Preamble to its final regulations under ERISA Section 404(c), the DOL takes the
position that a participant's exercise of control is not the cause of a loss attributable
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Third, even if participants carry the burden of showing that ERISA
Section 404(c) plan fiduciaries violated their retained duties by offering or
continuing to offer a company stock investment alternative, and that the
breach was the proximate cause of participants' losses, plan fiduciaries may
be incapable of reimbursing participants' losses. For example, the Enron
401(k) Plan participants suffered over $1 billion in retirement plan losses
attributable to Enron company stock holdings.160 It is unlikely that they will
find sufficiently deep pockets to adequately reimburse them for such
monumental losses. While Enron carried $85 million in fiduciary liability
insurance to cover lawsuits related to benefit plan losses and another $350
million for directors' and officers' insurance "to protect the company and
top officials from liability if they are sued,"'16 1 the availability, as well as
the sufficiency, of these and other funds to pay any forthcoming judgment
is questionable.
Fourth, the retained duty to prudently select and monitor investment
alternatives may become entirely obsolete through plan fiduciaries'
selection of self-directed brokerage accounts. In recent years, employers
have designed their ERISA Section 404(c) plans to include a self-directed
brokerage account,162 which provides participants with the opportunity to
invest in all publicly traded securities, including company stock. 163 Offering
self-directed brokerage accounts as an investment alternative reduces plan
fiduciaries' liability to participants' underlying investment selections. '6 4
Arguably, self-directed brokerage account plans can eliminate most
to the imprudent selection of an investment alternative. Id.
16' Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 25.
161 John Keilman, No Assurance ofEnron Insurance Payouts; Some Firms Try
to Void Policies, CH. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2002, at 1 ("[T]ypically, money from both
kinds of insurance goes first for defense costs, and Enron has already asked a
bankruptcy judge for pennission to use $30 million to pay the legal expenses of
current and former officials. Whatever is left can be used to pay claims, but since
the Enron case could drag on for years, the kitty could dwindle to nothing by the
time a settlement or judgment is reached.").
62 Hewitt Associates, Self-Directed Brokerage Accounts, supra note 10 (study
of 290 plan sponsors in the U.S. found that "[m]ore than half of the companies
surveyed (55%) currently offer, will add, or are considering adding a self-directed
brokerage account within the next 18 months... [with a]bout nine in ten plans
(89%) that currently offer or will offer the option in the next 18 months allow[ing]
participants to trade in individual securities, as well as a broad range of no-load
mutual funds").
163 See id. (defining self-directed brokerage accounts).
'64 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1), (2)(i)(A) (2003).
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investment-related fiduciary responsibilities unless participants fail to give
investment instructions.
165
3. 401(k) Plan Participants' Inability to
Prudently Manage Account Assets
In the context of 401(k) plans that offer a company stock investment
alternative, there are two reasons why participants are failing to prudently
invest their account assets: (1) their unfamiliarity with prudent investment
practices developed in the field of finance and investment and (2) employer
influence over participants' investment decisions. This sub-part addresses
the first reason, with the second reason discussed in Part II under the
analysis of the House Bill's investment advice proposal.
Assuming that employer-facilitated independent individually-tailored
investment advice to participants can promote diversification and prudent
investment practices, 401 (k) plan participants are not receiving such advice.
This is because 401(k) plan fiduciaries are not required to facilitate
investment advice as a cost of ERISA Section 404(c) fiduciary liability
relief.66 Part of the reason for the DOL's failure to include an investment
advice requirement is the liability distinctions it draws from ERISA's
definition of a "fiduciary" and ERISA's prohibited transaction rules.
ERISA defines a fiduciary to include any person who renders plan
investment advice for a fee.'67 If the types of information provided by the
'
6 5 See, e.g., Andrea S. Rattner & Elena Eracleous, Back-Door Way of Invest-
ing in Employer Stock, 17 CORP. COUNS. 1 (2002) (noting that self-directed
brokerage accounts may be problematic where the employer's workforce is
unsophisticated and not highly educated); Morton A. Harris & William D. Berry,
Working With The Direct Investment Option Under ERISA § 404(c), ALI-ABA
Course of Study, 1263, 1299 (2002), at SH012 ALI-ABA 1263 ("It is felt by many
authorities that an 'open option' plan will eliminate all investment-related fiduciary
responsibilities of the employer unless a participant fails to give any investment
instructions." (citing 29 C.F.R. 2550.404c- 1 (b)(1), (2)(i)(A))).
16i 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c- 1 (c)(4) (providing that fiduciary has no obligation
to provide investment advice to a participant or beneficiary under an ERISA
Section 404(c) plan).
167 ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (2003) (providing that
a person is a fiduciary to the extent he "renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of
[a] plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so"); see also 29 C.F.R. §
2510.3-21(c). Under DOL Defmitions and Coverage, the meaning of "investment
advice" is restricted to circumstances in which the advice relates to the value of the
assets or the advisability of the investment transaction, and the investment adviser
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plan sponsor or a third party service provider rise to the level of investment
advice, then that person is deemed a fiduciary with respect to that
investment advice and ERISA Section 404(c)'s fiduciary liability relief is
negated for any losses (or potentially inadequate gains). 6 ' Further, the
DOL interprets ERISA's prohibited transaction rules as precluding third
party service providers from rendering investment advice on any invest-
ment alternative for which the provider may receive an additional fee as a
result of the participants' investment decisions. 6 9 Absent a prohibited
transaction exemption, "interested" third party service providers are
effectively precluded from independently offering investment advice to
participants.' °
Based on these liability distinctions, ERISA Section 404(c) regulations
only require that plan fiduciaries provide participants with "sufficient
information" to make informed investment decisions, 71 including
information conveying a general description of the investment objectives
and risk and return characteristics of each investment altemative.'72 In the
context of a company stock investment alternative, the company's most
recent prospectus, financial statements, and reports satisfy the sufficient
information requirement.'73
Two subsequent DOL actions aimed at facilitating voluntary invest-
ment education and investment advice have not rectified the DOL's initial
failure to mandate an investment advice requirement. In 1996, the DOL
issued an interpretive bulletin containing safe harbors under which certain
either has discretionary authority to buy or sell plan property or provides the advice
on a regular basis, and pursuant to an agreement or understanding that the advice
will serve as a primary basis for plan investment decisions and that such advice will
be individualized based on plan needs. Id.
68 See ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c).
169 See ERISA § 406(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1) (2003) ("A fiduciary with
respect to a plan shall not deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for
his own account.. . ."); id. § 406(b)(3) ("A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not
receive any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with
such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan.").
170 See, e.g., Prohibited Transaction Exemption 92-75, 57 Fed. Reg. 45,832,
45,833 (Oct. 5, 1992). DOL approved of Shearson Lehman's proposal to offer
investment advice to participants in plans that used its mutual funds as investment
options under a fixed fee arrangement, thus removing any incentive to steer plan
participants into Shearson Lehman mutual funds. Id.
'' 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(l).
17 Id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(ii).
'73 Id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(viii), (2)(ii).
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information and materials are deemed "investment education" materials and
can be provided to participants without transforming the provider into an
ERISA fiduciary or causing interested parties to violate the prohibited
transaction rules. 174 Under the safe harbors, plan fiduciaries, including third
party service providers, may offer "plan information, general financial and
investment information, asset allocation models and interactive investment
materials." '175 Then, in 2001, the DOL issued an advisory opinion (the
"SunAmerica Opinion")176 under which interested third party service
providers can provide investment advisory services to individual account
plan participants without violating ERISA's prohibited transaction rules.
To interject a level of independence, however, the interested party
investment advice must be based on asset allocation recommendations that
are the product of a computer program developed by an independent
financial expert.'77
The 1996 investment education safe harbors virtually guaranteed that
participants would not receive investment advice that falls outside of the
enumerated safe harbors. This is evidenced by the fact that the vast
majority of participant-directed 401(k) plan participants receive only the
types of investment education sanctioned by the safe harbors,'78 with such
generic investment education playing a limited role in encouraging prudent
investment selection. 179 Similarly, while the 2001 SunAmerica Opinion did
stimulate interested party investment advisory services for some sectors of
174 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Participant Investment Education, 29
C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (2003).
175 Id. For a complete analysis of Interpretive Bulletin 96-i 's safe harbors, see
Colleen E. Medill, The IndividualResponsibility Model ofRetirementPlans Today:
Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 51-55 (2000) [hereinafter
Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today].
'
76 Dep't of Labor Advisory Op. 2001-09A, www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/programs/
ori/advisory200l/2001-09A.htm (Dec. 14, 2001) [hereinafter SunrAmerica
Opinion].
17 7
.ld.
178 PROFIT SHARING/401(K) COUNCIL OF AM., 45TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF
PROFIT SHARINGAND 401 (K) PLANS 47 (2002), http://www.psca.org/data/45th.html
[hereinafter PSCA 45TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PROFIT SHARING AND 401 (K) PLANS].
179 Robert L. Clark & Madeleine B. d'Ambrosio, Financial Education and
Retirement Savings, in RETIREMENT IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND FAMILY
CHANGE SYMPOSIUM 6 (June 2002), at http://www.soa.org/library/monographs/
retirementsystems/M-RS02-2/M-RS02-2_challengejU.pdf(citing Leslie Muller,
Investment Choice in Defined Contribution Plans: The Effects of Retirement
Education on Asset Allocation (2000) (unpublished paper on file with the Social
Security Administration, Washington D.C.)).
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the 401(k) plan population, i" ° it had little impact on 401(k) participants
employed by large publicly traded companies, the same companies that are
more likely to offer a company stock investment alternative. Because of the
associated costs, large publicly traded companies are less likely than
smaller companies to offer investment advice.' Only approximately 20%
of large, publicly traded companies offer some type of investment advice. 81
2
Additionally, for those participants who do receive investment advisory
services under the SunAmerica Opinion parameters, those services are
generally limited to rendering advice on mutual fund investment alterna-
tives. ' 3 Because these services rely on statistical methodology that is not
easily adaptable to individual stock offerings,8 4 they do not advise
participants with respect to individual stocks, such as the employer's
company stock.'85
180 See PSCA 45TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PROFIT SHARING AND 401 (K) PLANS,
supra note 178, at 52 (indicating that 41.4% of profit sharing and 401(k) plans
offer some sort of investment advice, with slightly more than half of the 41.4%
providing one-on-one, in-person counseling, 38.3% utilizing internet advisers, and
27.1% making telephone hotlines available).
181 Id. ("Advice is offered most frequently at small companies, and least
frequently at large companies. Advice is offered in 55% of plans with fewer than
50 participants, but only in 25.7% of plans with 5,000 or more participants.").
182 Id. See also House Education & the Workforce Committee Fact Sheet,
Retirement Security Advice Act, at http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/107th/
workforce/erisa/onepagefs.htm (Nov. 7, 2001) ("Only 16 percent of 401(k)
participants have an investment advice option available through their retirement
plan."); Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (PSCA), Investment Advice
Survey 2001, at http://www.psca.org/data/advice2001.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2003). In a survey of 141 member companies, respondents indicated that 22% of
companies were currently offering investment advice to plan participants.
Companies with small (1-49 participants) and medium-sized plans (1000 to 4999
participants) were more likely to offer investment advice (approximately 41%). In
contrast, large plans (5000+ participants) are less likely to offer investment advice
(15.8%). Id.
183 Paul Katzeff, More 401(k) Plans Give Specific Advice, INVESTOR'S BUS.
DAILY, Dec. 26, 2002, at A7.
114 Id. ("Our methodology is not designed to do individual stock screenings,"
quoting Netal Ringquist, executive vice-president for sales, marketing and client
service of Mpower.).
' Id. (noting that neither Mpower nor CitiStreet Advisors, two third-party
service providers that developed investment advisory services based upon the
DOL's SunAmerica advisory opinion, provides investment advice with respect to
individual stocks).
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Lacking the financial acuity to make prudent investment decisions, 186
participants are left to their own devices to sift through hundreds of pages
of general "investment education" materials, with the result being both
overly aggressive and overly conservative investment selections that fail to
adequately diversify account assets. The overly aggressive nature of some
participants' investment decisions is evidenced by their failure to diversify
account assets among numerous investment alternatives. For example,
although participant-directed 401 (k) plans now offer on average thirteen to
fourteen investment options, 1 7 with an increasing number of plan sponsors
offering a brokerage option with virtually unlimited investment options, 
88
most participants invest in just two or three investment alternatives with
each selected investment concentration significantly more than the
recommended 10 to 20% concentration. 189 The overly conservative nature
of some participants' investment decisions is evidenced by their failure to
achieve gains commensurate with those achieved by institutional investors.
186 Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today,
supra note 175, at 16 ("Research studies indicate that there is a lack of knowledge
among the public concerning retirement savings goals, basic investment
information, and a realistic assessment of the amount of time likely to be spent in
retirement."); Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 8 (statement of
Elaine L. Chao, Secretary, United States Department of Labor) ("Most people
simply don't have the time or the inclination to become experts on managing
financial portfolios, even their own."); Participants Continue To View Company
Stock As Lower Risk Equity, DC PLAN INVESTING, June 1, 2002, at 2002 WL
7308763 (citing 2002 John Hancock survey perceiving "a strong lack of investment
knowledge and skill on the part of [401 (k)] plan participants").
187 See PSCA 45TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PROFIT SHARING AND 401 (K) PLANS,
supra note 178 ("The number of funds offered to plan participants continues to
increase. 69.8% of plans offer 10 or more funds for participant contributions, up
from 61.5% in 2000 and 51.2% in 1999. The average number of funds available for
participant contributions is 14.5%.").
181 Id. (providing 16% of all plans offer a self-directed mutual fund window or
brokerage window); see also Hewitt Associates, Self-Directed BrokerageAccounts,
supra note 10 (indicating that more than half of the companies surveyed currently
offer, will add, or are considering adding a self-directed brokerage account within
18 months from survey date).
"89 Craig Gunsauley, Unlimited Options, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, at http://
www.benefitnews.com/retire/detail.cfn?id=3143 (July 2002). This is according to
data from PSCA and the Society ofProfessional Recordkeepers and Administrators
("SPARK"). Id.
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A 2002 study conducted by the National Center for Policy Analysis19 °
found that many participants barely keep up with inflation because they
invest too conservatively, as ERISA Section 404(c) investment returns have
been 2% lower per year than returns achieved by institutional investors."'
Other studies indicate that younger employees, those in a better position to
invest more aggressively, may be among the most conservative of
investors. 1
92
While overly aggressive and overly conservative investment selections
are imprudent and jeopardize participants' retirement security, it is
employers' unfettered ability to offer company stock as an investment
alternative that places participants at the greatest risk. The vast majority of
participant-directed 401(k) plans with a company stock investment
alternative take advantage of the lack of an overall limitation on company
stock investment and does not impose any limitation on employee elective
deferral contribution investment in company stock.' 93 In the absence of plan
limitations, participants are incapable of assessing the relative risk and
return characteristics of company stock. For example, in a recent survey
conducted by the Boston Research Group of 401 (k) plan participants with
company stock holdings, the majority of responding participants who were
aware of the losses suffered by Enron 401(k) Plan participants indicated
that they did not believe that their own company stock holdings were
excessive, even though one-third of responding participants held 40% or
more of their total assets in company stock.'94 According to the survey,
participants believed that a 31% company stock concentration was prudent
190 News Release, National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), People Who
Want to Invest Your Money Are Doing a Lousy Job of Investing Their Own, at
http://www.ncpa.org/prs/rel/2001/nrO1dec10.html (Dec. 10, 2001).
191 Id. (noting that lower returns on investments hit low-wage workers the
hardest).
192 See Jeff Sommer, Global Action on Aging, 401(k) Investors Want More
Advice, at http://www.globalaging.org/pension/us/private/401.htn (Sept. 22, 2002)
(citing July-August 2002 survey by Cigna Retirement and Investing Services that
found among the 18 to 25 age group, only 26% reported that they held stocks or
stock mutual funds; in contrast, 76% of the 48 to 56 age group held stocks).
193 EBRI Special Report: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, supra note 8, at 6
("14 percent of those having a company stock investment option in the 40 1(k) plan
reported that they limited the amount or percentage of company stock that
employees may hold in their 40 1(k) plan.").
194 See Participants Continue To View Company Stock As Lower Risk Equity,
supra note 186 (citing Boston Research Group April 2002 survey).
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and that their company stock holdings carried the same or less risk than
money market funds, which are considered low risk investments.1 95 Other
reasons cited for the participants' decisions to continue excessive invest-
ment in company stock were the company stock's historical performance
and institutionally fostered feelings of employee loyalty.'96
Exacerbating the problem, almost half of 401(k) plans that offer a
company stock investment alternative require employer matching contribu-
tions in the form of company stock. 97 Maintaining the excessive concentra-
tion, a significant number of these plans restrict participants' ability to
diversify 401(k) plan company stock holdings attributable to employer
matching contributions. 9 Such was the case with Enron's 401(k) Plan,
which made employer matching contributions' 99 in the form of treasury
shares200 and restricted diversification of those contributions until
participants attained age fifty.20'
The combined effect of employee elective deferral contributions and
employer contributions directed to a company stock investment alternative
is that approximately 30% of plan assets are invested in company
'
95 Id. (indicating that 50% saw company stock as less risky than tech mutual
funds and no riskier than a money market mutual fund; 39% thought company
stock had the same or less risk than a government bond mutual fund).
'
9 6 Id. (providing that 74% of participants cited stock's historical performance;
54% cited company loyalty); see also OLIVIA S. MITCHELL & STEPHEN P. UTKUS,
Company Stock andRetirement Plan Diversification, in THE PENSION CHALLENGE:
RISK TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 2002,30 (Pension Research
Council Working Paper No. 2002-4, 2002) (citing results of numerous studies with
similar findings, on file with author).
' Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 11; see also PSCA, Company Stock
2002, supra note 8, at tbl.9 (providing that one-third of respondent plans direct
employer matching contributions to the company stock investment alternative).
'
98 EBRI Special Report: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, supra note 8, at 5
("Of the 401 (k) plans where employer contributions were required to be invested
in company stock: 13 percent reported no restrictions existed for selling the
company stock[;] 27 percent reported that they were restricted throughout a
participant's investment in the plan[;] 60 percent reported that they were restricted
until a specified age and/or service requirement is met.").
'99 Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 112 (statement of Mike
Rath, Benefits Manager, Enron Corporation) (explaining that, beginning in 1998,
Enron began making employer matching contributions based on 50% of up to 2%
of pay, which was increased in 1999 and again in 2000 to 50% of up to 6% of pay).2
.1d. at 130.
2' Id. at 235 (Article V. 16(a)).
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stock.2 °2 The diversification picture becomes increasingly bleak for
participant-directed 401(k) plans sponsored by large publicly traded
corporations.2 3 A recent Congressional study of the Fortune 50 companies
found that, on average, 40% of these companies' 401(k) plan assets are
invested in company stock, with 30% of these companies' plans more
heavily invested in company stock than Enron's 401(k) plan.20 4 An earlier
survey conducted by IOMA's DC Plan Investing found that twenty-five of
the 219 large companies surveyed reported that their 401 (k) plans contained
a higher company stock concentration than Enron's 401(k) Plan did.20 5
Companies such as Procter & Gamble, Sherwin Williams, and Abbott
Laboratories all had at least 90% of their plan assets invested in company
stock, with Coca-Cola, General Electric, Pfizer, and Anheuser-Busch
having more than 70% of their plan assets invested in company stock.20 6
Although a significant portion of the aforementioned plans are actually
hybrid plans ("KSOPs") and not stand-alone 401(k) plans,20 7 that fact does
202 EBR1 Special Report: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, supra note 8, at 2
(indicating 32% of plan assets are invested in company stock where the plan
sponsor does not offer a guaranteed investment contract, and 28% if a GIC is
offered under the plan); Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 10 (indicating that of
401(k) plans offering company stock as an investment alternative, 29% of plan
assets are invested in company stock); Purcell, Employer Stock in Retirement
Plans, supra note 27, at 9-10 (examining data from large, publicly traded
companies sponsoring individual accounts plans, and finding that, on average, 38%
of plan assets are invested in company stock).
203 See Munnell & Sunden, supra note 3, at 3 (showing 72% of plans with
5000 or more participants offered company stock as a plan investment alternative,
with 43.3% of plan assets invested in company stock).
204 U.S. Senate Democratic Policy Committee Special Report, The Fortune 50:
Company Stock as a Percentage of 40l (k) Plan Assets, released by Senator Byron
Dorgan, at http://www.democrats.senate.gov/-dpc/pubs/1 07-2-60.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2003). Exxon Mobil, General Electric, Duke Energy, Kroger, Chevron,
Home Depot, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Merrill Lynch, Proctor & Gamble,
McKesson HBOC, Target, Albertson's, Berkshire Hathaway, and Costco
Wholesale all reported 401 (k) company stock investment in greater concentration
than under Enron's 401(k) plans. Id.
20 Enron Debacle Will Force Clean Up of Company Stock Use in DC Plans,
DC PLAN INVESTING, Dec. 11,2001, at 2, www.ioma.com/mr/uploads/DCPIDecO 1
CoStock.pdf.
206 See Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement
Plans, supra note 8, at 4.
207 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 7-8 ("Media reports about the
concentration of company stock in retirement programs have sometimes confused
the difference between ESOPs and 401(k) plans. For instance, some 401(k) plans
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not negate the potential devastating impact that excessive company stock
holdings can have on plan participants' retirement security or on the
minimal retirement benefit being secured by the 401 (k) component of the
plan. For example, Proctor & Gamble's retirement plan has an ESOP
component, a profit sharing component, and a 401(k) component.20 8
Collectively, approximately 95% of the plan's assets are invested in
company stock.2"9 This translates into approximately 5% of the plan's
assets being held outside the plan's ESOP component, and only approxi-
mately 5% of plan participants' retirement assets diversified among other
investment alternatives. This result could not have been envisioned by
Congress's endorsement of supplemental ESOPs.
II. CONGRESS' MISGUIDED ATTEMPT TO ENACT MEANINGFUL
PENSION REFORM THAT PROMOTES 401 (K) PLAN RETIREMENT SECURITY
In a year where corporate scandals highlighted the dangers of 401(k)
plan company stock holdings, Congress made little progress toward
enacting pension reform. On July 30, 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act ("Act"),21° which contains blackout notification requirements
and supersedes blackout proposals contained in numerous pension reform
bills introduced in Congress. 1
With the reintroduction of the Pension Security Act of 2002, the
Pension Security Act of 2003 has emerged as the frontrunner for any future
pension reform.21 2 The House Bill, however, rejects limitations on
participant-directed 401 (k) plan investment in company stock,2 13 which are
named as having high concentrations of employer stock are actually ESOP-centered
programs."). The article goes on to note that Procter and Gamble, Abbott
Laboratories, Anheuser-Busch, Ford Motor Company, and Pfizer all sponsor
hybrid KSOPs. Id. at 8-10.
208 Id. at 8.
209 id.
210 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
211 See ERISA § 101(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(i) (2002) (as amended by Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 306(b)(1) (enacted on July 30, 2002)).
212 Joshua H. Sternoff& Nicole K. Watson, Pension Reform Act I.- Accounting
Industry Reform Act Enacted; Next Step: Pension Reform Legislation, 2-3, at
http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/sopaulhastings.pdf (2002).
213 See H.R. 3463, 107th Cong. (2002) (proposing a 10% limitation on
company stock investment attributable to employee elective deferrals); S. 1838,
107th Cong. (2002), H.R. 3640 & H.R. 3692 (proposing a 20% limitation on
company stock investment for each individual account); H.R. 3677 (proposing a
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undoubtedly the most effective means of guarding against employer abuses
and influences. Instead, it relies on ancillary pension reform measures that
theoretically increase participants' ability to gain and assimilate informa-
tion and act prudently with respect to that information.
Part H provides a critical analysis of the Republican-backed House Bill
by analyzing the primary arguments against applying overall limitations to
participant-directed 401 (k) plans. It also examines select ancillary pension
reform proposals contained in the House Bill and the blackout notification
requirements enacted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and raises both
substantive and procedural questions that challenge the efficacy of these
measures to achieve the desired end.
A. The Unsupportable Rejection of Overall Limitations on Participant-
Directed 401(k) Plan Investment in Company Stock
The House Bill reflects the Bush Administration's acceptance of
arguments against overall limitations on 401(k) plan investment in
company stock without exploring the legitimacy of these arguments. None
of these arguments, however, adequately support the rejection of overall
limitations in such plans.
1. Overestimating the Importance
of ERISA Section 404(c) 's "Personal Responsibility!
Freedom of Choice" Component
The House Bill's failure to mandate overall limitations on 401 (k) plan
investment in company stock is based in large part on the Bush Administra-
tion's acceptance of the "personal responsibility/freedom of choice"
argument.21 4 Under this argument, overall limitations fly in the face of
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code's ("Code") historical policy of
20% limitation on elective deferrals for participants with less than three years of
participation, and, for all other participants, a 20% limitation on the entire vested
account balance); S. 1919 (imposing a 20% limitation).
24 White House Office of Communications, Report of the Department of the
Treasury on Employer Stock in 401(k) Plans (Feb. 28, 2002), at *4-7, 2002 WL
313307 [hereinafter White House, Report on 401(k) Plans] (rejecting "arbitrary"
limitations based on numerous findings, including the finding that limitations fail
to consider that individual account plan assets belong to participants and that the
government should not arbitrarily restrict how participants choose to invest their
own money).
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placing investment decisions in the hands of participants, who must be free
to invest their own contributions as they see fit.215
The personal responsibility/freedom of choice argument is a distortion
of the policy goals underlying the creation of ERISA Section 404(c) plans.
First, ERISA Section 404(c) is not the embodiment of Congressional
judgment that participants are entitled to unfettered control over account
assets. ERISA Section 404(c)'s authorization of participant-directed
individual account plans originated in a pre-ERISA retirement plan
landscape that was dominated by defined benefit plans. 16 When ERISA
was enacted, the relatively few individual account plans that were in
existence were predominantly profit-sharing plans and ESOPs,2 17 which
were often utilized to supplement the guaranteed benefits provided by the
employer's defined benefit plan.218 Moreover, these supplemental
individual account plans were primarily funded through employer
contributions, which were in turn invested by plan fiduciaries that were
subject to rigorous fiduciary standards enacted under ERISA.2 19 Through
ERISA Section 404(c), Congress expressed a willingness to give partici-
pants some measure of control over account assets in plans historically
relegated to the role of motivating employees rather than providing
retirement security.220
215 Id.; see also DOL, EMPLOYER ASSETS IN ERISA EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
PLANS, supra note 28, at 13 (rejecting overall limitations on ERISA Section 404(c)
plan asset investment in company stock based upon finding that no limitations
should be placed on participants' ability to direct their own individual account plan
assets); GAO REPORT, 401(K) PENSION PLANS, supra note 28 (rejecting overall
limitations in favor of enhanced reporting and disclosure requirements, prescribed
education programs, adoption of diversification requirements, and the use of
independent fiduciaries to examine investment decisions).
216 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 3 ("DC plans consisted mainly of
profit-sharing plans to which employers made variable plan contributions based on
company earning, and [ESOPs] which by design encouraged employers to make
employer stock contributions in an effort to foster employee ownership. DC plans
were thus not widely used as a retirement income vehicles [sic] and at many large
firms, they were supplemental to DB programs.").
217 id.
2 1 8 
Id.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 71-80 (explaining employee ownership
in context of supplemental individual account plans).
220 See S. Rep. 93-383, at 33 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4889,
4918 (stating that the limitation on investment by plans in company stock does not
apply to profit-sharing and stock bonus plans because such plans are intended as
an incentive to employees by allowing them to share in the profits of the company);
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Even in this limited role, however, ERISA's legislative history
indicates that Congress did not accept the unfettered personal responsibil-
ity/freedom of choice argument in the context of company stock holdings.
Instead, Congress expressed reservations about ERISA Section 404(c)'s
underlying premise that participants can, in fact, exercise independent
control over their account assets where company stock is offered as an
investment alternative . 2 1 Based on those reservations, Congress questioned
the administrative feasibility of such plans and came to a preliminary
conclusion that a company stock investment alternative may be
imprudent.222 Congress did not, however, proscribe company stock
investments, but instead placed the onus on the DOL to address the matter
under ERISA Section 404(c) regulations.223
The DOL finally responded to Congress' mandate on September 3,
1987, with proposed regulations to ERISA Section 404(c).224 Citing the
conference reports' concerns about participant-directed investment in
company stock,225 the proposed regulations did not provide fiduciary
liability relief under ERISA Section 404(c) to participant-directed
investment in company stock.226 The DOL did, however, invite comments
on the issue of whether participant-directed investment in company stock
S. Rep. 93-127, at 34 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4869
(explaining that limitation on company stock and general principles of diversi-
fication do not apply to profit sharing plans in recognition of their "special pur-
pose").
22 H.R. Rep. 93-1280, at 305 (1974) ("Because of the difficulty of ensuring
that there is independence of choice in an employer established individual retire-
ment account, it is expected that the regulations will generally provide that suf-
ficient independent control will not exist with respect to the acquisition of company
stock by participants and beneficiaries under this type of plan.").
222 Id.
223 id.
224 Proposed Reg. Respecting Participant Directed Individual Account Plans
(ERISA Section 404(c) Plans), 52 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (Sept. 3, 1987), 1987 WL
140902.225 Id. at 33,513.
2261 d. ("The proposed regulation does not provide relief under section 404(c)
with respect to these investments because the Department does not believe that it
has sufficient information to determine if it is appropriate to apply section 404(c)
to participant-directed investments which may benefit a plan sponsor, or to
determine the kinds of safeguards that might be appropriate to assure that
participants are not subjected to undue influence with respect to such invest-
ments.").
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should be allowed while limiting investment to a specified percentage of
overall account balances. 22
7
Following the receipt of more than 230 letters of comment and a public
hearing where numerous speakers were permitted to testify on the
appropriateness of granting ERISA Section 404(c) relief to participant-
directed investment in company stock,228 the DOL issued revised proposed
regulations.229 Under the revised proposed regulations, the DOL extended
ERISA Section 404(c) protection to participant-directed investment in
company stock under numerous conditions, including the requirement that
activities related to the purchase and sale of company stock be the
responsibility of an independent fiduciary (a fiduciary not affiliated with
any plan sponsor) who carries out such activities on a confidential basis.23°
227 Id. The proposed regulation states:
[T]he Department recognizes that many participant-directed plans do...
contemplate that section 404(c) would apply to at least some participant
decisions to invest in property acquired from an employer and in employer
securities and employer real property. Thus, the Department specifically
invites comments addressing the issue. Such comments should assist the
Department in developing a final rule that will limit the potential for the
exercise of improper influence by the plan sponsor, but not unduly restrict
participant investment options. The Department is particularly interested
in comments describing current practices with respect to property
acquired from or sold to plan sponsors, the benefits of such investments
and the safeguards which exist with respect to such investments.
With respect to employer securities, the Department is particularly
interested in commentators' views concerning whether a participant's
investments should be limited to a specified percentage of his account
balance and/or whether such investments should be limited to publicly-
offered securities.
Id.
228 Participant Directed IndividualAccount Plans, 56 Fed. Reg. 10,724 (Mar.
13, 1991) (explaining that numerous commentators have suggested sufficient
safeguards, including limiting relief to publicly-traded securities, the availability
of other investment alternatives, limiting the percentage of any participant's
account that could be invested in company stock, limiting the total outstanding
number of any class of securities that may be held by the plan at any time,
prohibiting plan sponsor solicitation and exhortation of participants with respect
to investment in company stock, passing through the incidents of stock ownership
to participants, and the use of independent fiduciaries to implement the purchase
and sale of company stock).229 id.
230 Id.
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Although the DOL initially believed that the appointment and involve-
ment of an independent fiduciary was critical for ensuring the meaning-
fulness of independent control by participants, with respect to company
stock investment,23' the DOL retreated from this position and eliminated the
independent fiduciary requirement from the final ERISA Section 404(c)
regulations.232 Instead, the final regulations included a requirement that an
ERISA Section 404(c) plan implement procedures designed to safeguard
the confidentiality of information relating to company stock holdings, and
that such plans designate a plan fiduciary to monitor plan compliance with
these procedures.233 The appointment of an independent fiduciary is only
required when a plan fiduciary, who is affiliated with the plan sponsor,
determines that a situation exists, such as a tender offer, exchange offer, or
contested board election, that raises the potential for undue employer
influence over participants.234
The DOL's failure to revisit the overall limitations on company stock
investment, in light of its retreat from an independent fiduciary require-
ment, essentially ignored past congressional concerns about potential
employer abuses surrounding company stock investment. Given that ERISA
Section 404(c) plans are no longer relegated to supplemental plan status
and are now riddled with the types of administrative and independent
control problems that initially raised congressional concerns, it is reason-
able to interpret ERISA as supporting limitations on participants' ability to
invest in company stock.
The personal responsibility/freedom of choice argument also ignores
the tax-subsidized nature of ERISA Section 404(c) plans. For over seventy-
five years, federal tax policy has encouraged employers to voluntarily
utilize qualified retirement plans in order to ensure greater retirement
security for all American workers. This encouragement has come in the
form of direct and indirect tax subsidization of qualified retirement plans.
Employer contributions made to a tax-qualified retirement plan are
deductible by the employer.23 s Further, employer contributions, employee
elective deferral contributions made under a 401(k) plan, and income
earned on trust fund assets are not taxed until ultimately distributed to
2311 Id. at 10,735.
232 Final Reg. Respecting Participant Directed Individual Account Plans
(ERISA Section 404(c) Plans), 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,926 (Oct. 13, 1992).
233 Id. at 46,926-27.
234 Id. at 46,932.
235 I.R.C. § 404 (2000).
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participants. This tax preference significantly reduces taxes paid by
American workers who receive part of their overall compensation through
their employers' qualified retirement plans, and significantly increases
taxes paid by all American workers, including the half of the American
workforce that does not benefit from employer-sponsored retirement plan
coverage.237
This tax preference is identified as a "tax expenditure" 238 in yearly
reports published by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the
Office of Management and Budget.239 The Joint Committee on Taxation
236 Id. § § 402(a), 404(a), 501(a).
237 Present Law and Background Relating to Employer-Sponsored Defined
Benefit Plans, Jt. Common Taxn. Print JCX-71-02, at 28, at http://www.house.gov/
jct/x-71-02.pdf (Jun. 18, 2002) ("48 percent of private sector employees
participated in employer-sponsored qualified retirement plans... among full-time
employees, participation was 56 percent.") (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics,
National Compensation Survey, Employee Benefits in Private Industry, 1999); see
also Munnell et al., supra note 34, at 3 (showing that the number of American
workers covered by some form of pension plan has remained nearly constant for
twenty-five years, at approximately 50% of the private sector workforce aged
twenty-five to sixty-four).
238 Tax expenditures are defined under the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of
the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from
gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a
deferral of tax liability." Thus, the definition of "tax expenditure" encompasses
special or preferential provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that benefit certain
groups of taxpayers at a cost to all taxpayers. Cong. Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 88 Stat 297 (1974); see also
Jonathan Barry Forman, Comparing Apples and Oranges: Some Thoughts on the
Pension and Social Security Tax Expenditures, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 297,314-15 (2001) ("[W]ith respect to pensions, the cash-flow method estimates
the taxes that 'should' be collected on contributions to pension plans and the
income earned on pension assets, but it does not measure the value of deferral of
income as benefits accrue. Put simply, 'no value is placed on the pension promise
itself, only on the advance funding of that promise.'") (footnote omitted); Dallas
L. Salisbury, The Cost and Benefits of Pension Tax Expenditures, in PENSION
FUNDING & TAXATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ToMORROw 85, 88 (Dallas L. Salisbury
& Nora Super Jones eds., Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1994).
239 JT. COMM. ON TAXN., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2002-2006, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbnane=2002_jointcommittee _on_taxation&docid=f:76452.pdf(Jan. 17,2002);
White House, Office of Mgt. and Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the
U.S. Govt., Fiscal Year 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/
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identifies the tax expenditure for qualified plans as the largest single tax
expenditure 24 and estimates that for the 2002 through 2006 fiscal years the
revenue loss attributable to the net exclusion of pension contributions and
earnings under employer plans will be $445 billion.24' The Office of
Management and Budget identifies the net exclusion of pension contribu-
tions and earnings as among the highest reported tax expenditures 242 and
estimates the net exclusion of pension contributions and earnings under
employer plans to be $615 billion for the 2003 through 2007 fiscal years.243
Given the fact that the federal government is providing billions of
dollars in tax breaks to qualified retirement plan sponsors and participants,
and that all Americans, including those that do not reap the benefits of
qualified retirement plan coverage, are paying higher taxes to subsidize
forgone revenues, federal tax policy discredits the argument that ERISA
Section 404(c) plan assets belong solely to the respective participants and
that investment decisions are their private financial decisions. Federal tax
policy mandates that pension reform measures ensure retirement security
for American workers, and that these measures do not continue to foster a
forum in which participants can invest their own and the federal govern-
ment's assets (deferred tax liability) in an imprudent manner.
2. Overestimating the Negative Impact of
Implementing Overall Limitations on ERISA Section 404(c)
Plan Investment in Company Stock
The House Bill's failure to mandate overall limitations on 401 (k) plan
investment in company stock is based also on the Bush Administration's
spec.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter OMB, Budget].
240 ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2002-2006,
supra note 239, at 27.
241 Id. (noting that the $445 billion estimate does not include many other tax
expenditures relating to qualified retirement plans, including a $78.5 billion
estimate for individual retirement plans, a $29.3 billion estimate for Keogh plans,
and a $5.7 billion estimate for special tax provisions for employee stock ownership
plans).242 OMB, Budget, supra note 239, tbl.6- 1, at 100 (explaining that the exclusion
for pension contributions is divided into a net exclusion of pension contribution
and earnings for 401(k) plans and a separate exclusion for employer plans; if the
separate rankings were combined, then the net exclusion of pension contributions
and earnings is the highest tax expenditure under the OMB rankings).243 Id. The $615 billion estimate for fiscal years 2003 through 2007 includes
tax expenditures relating to employer plans, including 401 (k) arrangements. Id.
[VOL. 92
2003-2004] PENSION REFORM IN THE AFTERMATH OF ENRON
acceptance of a deterrence argument.24 There are several components to
this argument, each of which points to several deleterious effects on plan
sponsorship and plan participation. Under one component of this argument,
overall limitations that restrict an employer's ability to make employer
contributions in the form of company stock will deter employers from
making employer matching contributions, thus negatively impacting plan
sponsorship and plan participation.2 45 The basis of this component is that
employer contributions, including employer matching contributions, made
in the form of existing treasury shares of company stock, impose no
immediate cash cost on the company and are not included on the company's
income statement, yet the contributions provide the company with an
immediate tax deduction equal to the fair market value of the shares at the
time they were contributed to the plan (without discounting the value for
any restrictions imposed under the terms of the plan).2 46 Because of these
purported benefits, opponents of overall limitations argue that employers
are less likely to make employer contributions in the form of cash.247
There are numerous facts that undercut the validity of this argument;
the most important is that overall limitations can be implemented without
restricting employers' ability to make employer matching contributions in
the form of company stock. For example, the Senate Finance Bill 248
contains a "choice" proposal under which employers can continue making
employer matching contributions in the form of company stock so long as
244 White House, Report on 401 (k) Plans, supra note 214, at * 1-2 (reporting
that limitations disrupt markets for certain large, publicly traded companies, as
substantial amounts of stock in certain companies would have to be sold
immediately in order to comply with the imposed limitation; arbitrary caps on
individual 401(k) account holdings in employer stock would have a potentially
severe disruptive effect on the stock prices of several major companies, with as
many as one in five 401(k) participants forced to change their investment
allocations if employer stock holdings were limited to 20%; limitations discourage
employer matching contributions, which in turn discourages plan participation).
245 Coalition on Employee Retirement Benefits, Letter to Members of the
United States Congress, at 2, http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/
fmalcerbletter3102.pdf (Feb. 25, 2002) [hereinafter CERB, Letter to
Congress] ("Percentage caps, limits on holding periods, and diversification
mandates will limit employee choice and deter employer matches.").
246 Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans,
supra note 8, at 4-5.
247 See CERB, Letter to Congress, supra note 245.
248 S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002).
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participants are not allowed to direct employee elective deferral contribu-
tions into a company stock investment alternative.249
Additionally, employer contributions made in the form of company
stock have an immediate cost. Employer contributions made in the form of
treasury shares dilute share value.25" Further, these contributions are often
made with shares purchased on the open market and not through treasury
shares.5
Even if employers are restricted from making employer contributions
in the form of company stock, there are numerous reasons why they will
instead make those contributions in the form of cash. Employer matching
contributions attract new employees and encourage current employees to
participate in and contribute to the plan.252 To the extent that increased plan
participation is attributable to lower-paid employees, there is an increased
likelihood that the plan will satisfy Code nondiscrimination require-
ments, 253 even where higher paid employees are receiving and making
substantial contributions under the plan. These facts encourage employer
matching contributions made in the form of cash.
Under a second component of the deterrence argument, overall
limitations on company stock will place significant administrative burdens
on plan fiduciaries, including running individual account computations
249 Id. § 102.
250 Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 17 ("By issuing new shares and
contributing them directly to the plan, the firm avoids spending cash on a matching
contribution. Issuing new shares preserves cash flow, so this approach might be
expected to be popular among cash-strapped firms. The dilemma, of course, is that
issuing new shares to the retirement plan dilutes existing shareholders' interest;
economically, the firm's net present value has been reduced, whether the
contribution is in cash or in stock.").
251 Shlomo Benartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k)
Accounts to Company Stock, 56 J. FIN. 1747, 1750 (2001), http://www.anderson.
ucla.edu/faculty/shlomo.benartzi/excessive.pdf (stating that one-third of all finns
buy stock in the open market to finance individual account plan contributions,
while the two-thirds issue new shares).
2 2 See White House, Report on 401(k) Plans, supra note 214, at *3 ("Research
shows that employees themselves are more likely to participate in their company's
401(k) plan when their employer offers matching contributions."); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFF., 401(K) PENSION PLANS: LOAN PROVISIONS ENHANCE
PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECT INCOME SECURITY FOR SOME, GAO/HEHS-98-5,
at 5 (Oct. 1997) (employer matching contributions increase plan participation by
approximately 20%).
253 I.R.C. § 4 10(a) & (b) (2000) (minimum participation standards).
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annually and requiring a large number of participants to sell company stock
held in excess of imposed limitations.254 These burdens, which are present
only where overall limitations come in the form of a percentage limitation,
are overestimated. Among other things, snapshot testing, which essentially
looks at a single day during the plan year, can be used to determine
compliance with overall limitations.2" Further, benefit statements that
reflect individual account plan asset allocations can be used for purposes
of determining whether a certain account contains an excessive concentra-
tion in company stock.256 The prospective phase-in of overall limitations
could effectively mitigate administrative burdens and market fluctuations
arising from the immediate imposition of overall limitations.
Under a third component of the deterrence argument, overall limita-
tions are tantamount to a level of over-regulation that discourages publicly
traded companies from establishing or maintaining 401 (k) plans. In support,
opponents of overall limitations trace the decline of traditional defined
benefit plans to the enactment of laws that made defined benefit plan
sponsorship more burdensome and costly. 7 Over the more than twenty-
five years since its enactment, ERISA has been amended numerous times,
including amendments that raise the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion's defined benefit plan insurance premium rate, increase the minimum
and maximum funding standards for defined benefit plans, and require
pension accruals or allocations for previously excludable employees.258 The
majority of these amendments, however, increase the funding and
administrative costs of sponsoring traditional defined benefit plans. They
are fundamentally different from overall limitations on company stock,
254 White House, Report on 401(k) Plans, supra note 214, at *7 (estimating that
one out of every five 40 1(k) participants "may have to sell employer stock if caps
were imposed," which "would precipitate the sale of hundreds of millions of
shares" and a disruption of the market that could affect the stock price of certain
large corporations).
255 Snapshot testing has been utilized to determine whether qualified plans
meet the I.R.C.'s nondiscrimination requirements, where plans select a
representative day of the employer's workforce and plan coverage. See Rev. Proc.
93-42, § 3, 1993-31 I.R.B. 32.
256 Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans,
supra note 8, at 5-6.
257 Sylvester J. Schieber et al., Stretching the Pension Dollar: Improving U.S.
Retirement Security and National Saving by Enhancing Employer-Based Pension
Plans, 3 at http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/pensionpaper.pdf
(1999).
258 See EBRI, Facts from EBRI, History of Pension Plans, supra note 53.
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which can be designed to have a negligible impact on funding and
administrative costs, as noted above. Thus, there is little anecdotal evidence
that implementing overall limitations on 401(k) plan investment in
company stock rises to the level of excessive governmental intervention
that results in reducing employer sponsorship and employer contributions
to these plans.
3. Overvaluing ERISA's Secondary Federal
Policy Goal of Promoting Employee Ownership
The House Bill's failure to mandate overall limitations on 401 (k) plan
investment in company stock is also based on the Bush Administration's
acceptance of the employee ownership argument, which essentially
provides that overall limitations will negatively affect ERISA's policy goal
of promoting employee ownership in individual account plans.259 As
previously noted, this argument is a distortion of ERISA's secondary
federal policy goal that was relegated to supplemental individual account
plans.26 Further, ERISA's employee ownership goal cannot be attributed
to 401(k) plans, which were nonexistent at the time of ERISA's
enactment.' Assuming that the federal policy goal of employee ownership
has some role in 401(k) plans, however, this sub-part addresses the main
arguments for promoting employee ownership through 401(k) plan
investment in company stock and how these arguments fail to justify
unfettered company stock investment.
One of the touted benefits of 401 (k) plan investment in company stock
is the positive correlation between company stock ownership and employee
productivity, which in turn benefits the employer and company sharehold-
ers, including employee-shareholders.262 Theoretically, investment in
259 White House, Report on 401(k) Plans, supra note 214, at *3 ("Many
companies believe that giving employees company stock builds their employees'
loyalty to the company and gives them a greater economic incentive to work to
promote the company's long-term economic prospects.").
260 S. Rep. 93-127, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4839
(explaining the historical justification for individual account plan investment in
company stock).
261 See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978)
(identify'ing the Revenue Act of 1978 as the law creating 40 1(k) arrangements).
262 Hearings on Enron and Beyond Enhancing Worker Retirement Security,
supra note 119 (testimony of Dr. Douglas Kruse, Professor, School of
Management & Labor Relations, Rutgers University) ("Employee ownership has
attracted attention and interest for a wide variety of reasons. Much of the interest
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company stock leads to company productivity gains because of employees'
perceived connection between their individual efforts and company stock
value.263
Evidence of a positive correlation between increasing levels of
employee ownership and employee productivity is tentative, at best.
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between employee stock
ownership and employee productivity in the context of stand-alone ESOPs.
Because these plans are designed to invest primarily in company stock,26
and thus generally have a large percentage of plan assets invested in
company stock, any positive correlation between employee ownership and
employee productivity should be more discernible. But, the vast majority
of these studies found no statistically meaningful correlation between
increased levels of employee ownership and employee productivity.265
has focused on the potential for better economic performance, particularly through
enhanced motivation and commitment from employees who have a direct stake in
the firm[s'] performance. Strong majorities of the public believe that employee-
owners work harder and pay more attention to the quality of their work than non-
owners .... "); Hearing on Retirement Security Before H.R. Comm. on Ways and
Means Subcomm. on Oversight Comm., 107th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2002) (statement of
Gene Little, Senior Vice President, Finance, Timken Company) ("Company stock
in 401(k) plans has been a powerful contributing factor to the economic
outperformance enjoyed by the U.S. economy relative to other industrialized
nations over the past decade. It brings about alignment with the company among
its associates. It makes associates owners, a tremendous catalyst for productivity
and company stock as a benefit, is as you know, an important enabler for start up
companies.").
263 Hearings on Enron and Beyond Enhancing Worker Retirement Security,
supra note 119.
64See ERISA § 407(c)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(c)(6) (2003) (defining employee
stock ownership plan).
25 See, e.g., Joseph Blasi et al., Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate
Performance Among Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 60, 78
(1996) (comparing corporate performance in 1990/91 of two groups of public
companies, those in which employees owned more than 5% of the company's stock
and all others and reaching conclusions consistent with prior employee ownership
studies: (1) "there is clearly no automatic connection between employee ownership
and performance" and (2) "where differences do exist [between the two groups of
companies], they tend to indicate better performance by [employee-owned
companies]."); Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and Economic
Distortion, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 127-29 (1986) ("A number of empirical
studies have attempted to measure the effects of ESOPs on employee productivity.
While ESOP proponents have pointed to some of this research as providing
compelling evidence that ESOPs are a proven success at raising worker morale,
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Before recent congressional hearings on Enron,266 Professor Douglas
Kruse, a preeminent authority on employee ownership, noted that over
seventy empirical studies have been conducted over the last twenty-five
years on the effects of employee ownership on employee productivity.
Based on his review of these studies, Professor Kruse concluded, among
other things, that while employee ownership does have some positive
effects on employee attitudes and firm productivity, higher levels of
organizational commitment and identification are present regardless of the
size of the employee-owner's stake in the company.267 Professor Kruse's
conclusions indicate that excessive 401(k) plan investment in company
stock is unnecessary to achieve the desired result of marginally increased
employee productivity.
A second touted benefit of employee ownership is that employees are
more familiar with a company stock investment alternative and, by looking
at its historical performance, invest in company stock when it outperforms
the gains derived from other plan investment alternatives.2 6' As evidenced
by the devastating losses suffered by Enron and WorldCom 401(k) plan
participants, there is no evidence that employees have any quantifiable
familiarity with company stock as an investment alternative.269 Moreover,
motivation, and output, a more balanced view recognizes that 'there has been no
conclusive evidence ... indicating that ESOPs serve as powerful employee
motivators or effective productivity enhancers.'") (citing numerous studies with
conflicting findings with respect to ESOPs' effectiveness on employee
productivity); Elana Ruth Hollo, The Quiet Revolution: Employee Stock Ownership
Plans and Their Influence on Corporate Governance, Labor Unions, and Future
American Policy, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 561, 593 (1992) ("While no evidence suggests
that ESOPs hurt productivity, the evidence which suggests that ESOPs increase
productivity is not particularly strong either. The types of ESOPs that are growing
in number, namely the large corporate plans, appear to have had little impact on
productivity.").
266 Hearings on Enron and Beyond Enhancing Worker Retirement Security,
supra note 119 (testimony of Douglas Kruse, Professor, School of Management &
Labor Relations, Rutgers University).
267 id.
268 Pension Plan Overhaul in Wake of Enron Collapse: Hearings on H.R. 10
Before the House Subcomm. on Employer Relations of the Comm. of Educ. and
Workforce, 107th Cong. 33-37 (2002) (statement of Angela Reynolds, Director of
International Pension and Benefits at the Dayton, Ohio based NCR Corporation,
testifying on behalf of the American Benefits Council).
269 Contrary to finding that employees are more familiar with a company stock
investment alternative, recent studies indicate that employees do not believe that
company executives are honest and forthright and therefore employees gain no
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there is no evidence that company stock outperforms other 401(k) plan
investment alternatives. Studies have found that, on average, the expected
rate of return on company stock investments is no greater than the rate of
return on diversified portfolios with less inherent risk.27
A third purported benefit of employee ownership is that it transforms
employees into "stakeholders" with a significant voice in company
management decisions. 271 The National Center for Employee Ownership
("NCEO") cites employee majority ownership of such companies as
Lifetouch, TTC, Inc., Publix Supermarkets and Science Applications as
proof that employees are becoming serious stakeholders in their
employers.272 Yet, the NCEO's own statistics reveal that of the 2200 401(k)
plans it estimates are primarily invested in company stock, 90% of these
plans have less than a 10% ownership stake in the company.273 Other
statistics indicate that employees attain only a marginal ownership interest
in their respective employers through their 401(k) plan investment in
company stock with that marginal interest doing more to help entrenched
specialized knowledge because of the employment relationship. See Business
Week/Harris Poll: How Business Rates: By the Numbers, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 11,
2000, http://www.businessweek.com:/2000/00_37/b3698004.htm?scriptFramed
(citing a June 2000 poll conducted by Harris Interactive Inc. and Business Week,
which reported that 74% of respondents did not believe that business does a good
job at being straightforward and honest with consumers and employees).
270 Purcell, Employer Stock in Retirement Plans, supra note 27, at 10 ("[F]or
any given expected rate of return, there exists a diversified portfolio of assets that
will provide the same expected rate of return with less risk to the investor than a
portfolio concentrated in company stock. Economists have estimated that a
portfolio invested in the stock of a single firm listed on the New York Stock
Exchange is, on average, twice as risky in terms of price volatility as a well-
diversified portfolio of stocks.") (citing Lisa Meulbroek, Company Stock in
Pension Plans: How Costly Is It? (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 02-058,
Mar. 2002)).
271 Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 7-8 (statement of Elaine
L. Chao, Secretary, United States Department of Labor) ("Our modem economy
is far from being perfect, but one of the wonders of the American system is that an
administrative assistant from Microsoft or Home Depot or General Electric can
become a millionaire by working hard, sticking with their company and investing
in it, and having a good investment strategy.").
272 National Center for Employee Ownership, A Comprehensive Overview of
Employee Ownership, at http://www.nceo.org/library/overview.html (Oct. 1,2002).
273 National Center for Employee Ownership, A Statistical Profile ofEmployee
Ownership, at http://www.nceo.org/library/eo stat.html (last updated Apr. 2002)
(data drawn from a 1995 NCEO survey of 401(k) plans).
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management than to transform employees into employee-owners with a
significant voice in company management and policy.
274
Based upon the questionable benefits derived from 401(k) plan
company stock investment, ERISA's employee ownership goal cannot
serve as a foundation for rejecting overall limitations on such investment,
particularly where that goal can be attained outside the context of tax-
subsidized 401(k) plans. Increased productivity can be attained by
increasing employee involvement and control in a company's decision-
making process, 275 including representation on a company's board of
directors and employee benefits committees.276 Employee ownership goals
274 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 19 ("For 65 of the largest corporate
DC plans in the US, we have calculated employee holdings as a percent of
outstanding market capitalization. In that sample, DC plan participants controlled
some 5.9 percent of the outstanding market capitalization of the average firm.
These data represent only DC company stock holdings and exclude other types of
stock ownership plans such as employee stock purchase plan[s] and stock options;
they also exclude unallocated shares in leveraged ESOPs that the employees may
indirectly control. In a tight takeover battle, a 6 percent position held by employees
might be very influential (presumably only if employees act in concert). Combined
with other employee holdings and stock held by senior management, the total figure
of employee-owned stock could be very significant. Nonetheless, overall, the data
indicate that DC participants own a small minority holding in the largest firns.");
Munnell & Sunden, supra note 3, at 6 (finding that among the Fortune 100
companies, employee holdings of company stock as a share of total company stock
averaged 7%).
275 See Brett McDonnell, ESOPS 'Failures: Fiduciary Duties When Managers
of Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. BUS.
L. REv. 199, 235 ("The empirical literature on ESOPs and worker ownership
suggests that ownership alone does little to improve productivity. While some
studies do find improvement, others do not, and the latter are analytically sounder
than the former. Overall, employee ownership alone at most increases productivity
only a small amount, and even that small increase is hard to demonstrate. However,
employee ownership combined with efforts to encourage greater employee
participation in decision-making does seem to increase productivity significantly.")
(citations omitted).
276 See Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 134 (testimony of
Teresa Ghilarducci, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Economics,
University of Notre Dame). Advocates of employee ownership as a means to align
employee/employer interests whole-heartedly reject employee representation on
plan administrative and employee benefits committees. Based on her extensive
research in the area, Dr. Ghilarducci found that the United States is the only
industrialized nation that does not mandate employee representation on such
committees. "In about half the countries, the employees represent half of the
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can also be achieved through alternative tax-favored mechanisms, such as
employee stock bonus plans or employee stock options. 2" Moreover,
alternative mechanisms have the added benefit of mitigating a phenomenon
known as the free rider problem. Particularly with respect to large publicly
traded companies, many experts have noted that employees have little
incentive to increase their productivity where the benefits of increased
productivity will be disseminated to all employees, regardless of their own
individual efforts and ownership stake.278 Where employee ownership is
linked to each individual's productivity through alternative tax-favored
mechanisms, productivity gains should theoretically evidence a significant
increase.
B. The Unsupportable Reliance on Ancillary Pension Reform Measures
1. Overvaluing the Benefits Derived From Diversification Rights
The House Bill contains a proposal giving participants the immediate
right to diversify employee elective deferral contributions previously
invested in company stock, and, after a three-year period, the ability to
diversify any other contributions (e.g., employer matching contributions)
made in the form of company stock.279 In contrast to leading pension reform
bills introduced in the Senate,28" the House Bill liberalizes the three-year
trustees, and in this country, 8 percent of pension plans have joint trustees. Those
are the ones that unions and management negotiate jointly." Id.
277 See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Company Stock:
More is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 75 (1998) (discussing
alternative mechanisms for employee ownership).
278 See McDonnell, supra note 275, at 234 ("In all but the smallest companies
there is a free rider problem--what worker owners should want is for everyone else
to work harder while they reap the benefits.... Even where the increased output
from one employee's input exists and is measurable, the worker has highly
imperfect incentives because that increased output is divided among all the other
owners. A worker bears all the cost of her increased effort, but gains only a fraction
of the benefit. The incentive to work harder thus becomes dimmer and dimmer as
the company becomes larger.").
279 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. § 104 (2003).
280 S. 1971, 107th Cong. § 101 (2002) (providing a three-year diversification
requirement phased in only with respect to company stock holdings beginning
before January 1, 2003); S. 1992, 107th Cong. § 102 (providing that plan
participants with three years of service are given right to divest company stock
holding attributable to employer contributions, with no transition rules for
implementation of three year diversification requirement).
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diversification requirement by giving plans the option of allowing
diversification of employer contributions as of a participant's completion
of three years of service or no later than three years after the end of the plan
year in which the contribution was allocated to each participant's
account. 2s' Further diluting the three-year diversification right, the House
Bill phases in this requirement over a five-year period for company stock
held by the plan as of the date the requirement is enacted into law.282
Although guaranteeing participants the ability to diversify account
assets has been promoted as the answer to the current lack of diversifica-
21tion, 83 there are two primary reasons why this uncontroversial approach is
likely to have little, if any, impact on plan asset diversification. First, with
respect to the immediate diversification right that applies to employee
elective deferral contributions previously invested in company stock,
current law already restricts an employer's ability to require that more than
10% of employee elective deferral contributions be invested in company
stock.284 The vast majority of participant-directed 401 (k) plans do not take
advantage of this 10% restriction, do not impose any diversification
restrictions on employee elective deferral contributions, and allow
participants the unfettered discretion to direct or redirect their own
contributions to any investment alternative offered under the plan.285 This
was the case with Enron's 401(k) Plan, which did not impose any
diversification restrictions on plan assets derived from employee elective
deferral contributions.28 6 Yet, despite their apparent ability to diversify a
281 H.R. 1000, § 104.
282 Id.
283 Press Release, Plans to Reintroduce Pension Security Act, supra note 41
("The [House Bill] will give employees new freedom to sell company stock and
diversify into other investment options.").
284 ERISA § 407(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1 107(b)(2) (2000).
285 See Olivia S. Mitchell, New Trends in US. Pensions, at 19, at http://www.
ier.hit-u.ac.jp/jprc/soukai/Mitchell.pdf (July 26, 2002) ("Thus some 87% of
employees with 401 (k) plans could elect among investment choices for their own
contributions."); PSCA, Company Stock 2002, supra note 8, at tbl.8 (showing that
only 1.1% of respondent plans required that some portion of employee elective
deferral contributions be invested in a company stock investment alternative, with
that percentage solely attributable to plans with 5000 or more participants).
286 Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 104 (statement of Mike
Rath, Enron Corporation, Benefits Manager) ("Participants are free to trade the
investments they select in their 401(k) accounts on a daily basis, including Enron
stock.").
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reported 89% of their company stock holdings,287 Enron participants chose
not to do so. Immediate diversification rights would have had no impact on
Enron 401(k) Plan participants, and there is no evidence that enacting
immediate diversification rights for all participant-directed 401(k) plan
participants will have any impact on plan asset diversification.
Second, with respect to the impact of the three-year diversification
right, recent surveys and reports indicate that lifting diversification
restrictions will have little impact on plan asset diversification. Not immune
to criticism, it appears that a significant portion of 401(k) plans with
company stock holdings have already removed employer contribution
diversification restrictions or are in the process of amending their plans to
remove such restrictions. While past studies indicated that over 85% of
ERISA Section 404(c) plans placed some restriction on participants' ability
to diversify employer contributions made in the form of company stock,288
more recent studies suggest that 65% of these participants can now choose
the investment alternatives for employer contributions.289 Yet, despite this
growing trend, 401 (k) plan accounts' asset diversification shows no signi-
ficant improvement. For example, a recent study by Hewitt found that only
287 Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans,
supra note 8, at 3 ("The company has estimated that 89% of this stock was
purchased by employees and that the remainder represents the corporation's
matching contributions to the plan ... " (citations omitted)).288EBPI Special Report: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, supra note 8, at 5.
International Society of Certified Employee Benefit Specialists members
responding to a survey indicated that, of the 401(k) plans where employer
contributions were made in the form of company stock, 27% reported that they
restricted diversification rights throughout a participant's investment in the plan
and 60% reported restriction until a participant attained a specified age and/or
service requirement. Id.
289 Mitchell, supra note 285, at 19 ("[Sixty-five percent of 401(k) plan
participants] could elect investment options for employer contributions."); Munnell
& Sunden, supra note 3, at 4 (citing a recent report by Fidelity showing "[thirty-
six] percent of the plans (covering twenty-one percent of participants) had either
removed restrictions on the sale of company stock in the last year or were
considering such a change"); Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Hewitt Survey
Reveals New Trends in Companies' 401(k) Plans, Employers Focus on
Diversification, Understanding 401(k) Plan and Savings Quality, at http://www.
hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroon/pressrel/2002/04-22-02.htm (Apr. 22,
2002). A survey conducted by Hewitt of 280 respondent companies found that
62% of companies that made employer matching contributions in the form of
company stock were either lifting, or considering lifting, restrictions on
diversification. Id.
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20% of 401(k) plan participants made any trades in their portfolio, despite
market volatility and horrendous losses suffered by employees who were
heavily invested in company stock.29
Participants' complacency with respect to both their own employee
elective deferral contributions and employer contributions not subject to
diversification restrictions may be due, in large part, to the tendency to
leave investment allocations as previously directed.2 9 Numerous studies
have found that 401(k) plan participants fail to actively manage their
account assets and instead leave plan assets in initial investment
selections.292 Given this tendency, participants are unlikely to make an
affirmative election to diversify company stock holdings.293 Although not
present in any current pension reform bills, meaningful diversification
rights would need to automatically trigger diversification of company stock
holdings into a default investment alternative absent participant direc-
tion.
290 Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Hewitt Research Shows U.S. Employees
Not Interacting with 401 (k) Plan for Optimal Benefit, Study Examines Employees'
401(k) Savings and Investing Habits in Reaction to 2001 Events, at http://was4.
hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom/pressrel/2002/07-08-02.htm (July 8, 2002)
(finding in an examination of 800,000 employees and 500,000 active 401(k)
participants found that in 2001 "only 19.5 percent of active 401(k) participants
made any form of trade" and attributing the disconnect investment behavior, in part
to inertia).
291 Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia
in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1185 (2001),
at http://mitpress.mit.edu/joumals/pdf/qjec_ 16 04 1149_0.pdf (analyzing the
impact of automatic enrollment on 401(k) savings behavior and discussing the
tendency to leave investment allocations as previously directed).
292 Id.; see also Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan
Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 80 (2002) [hereinafter Stabile, The Behavior
of Defined Contribution Plan Participants] (regarding "inertia," Stabile explains
that employees' preference for the status quo coupled with the lack of certainty
involved in directing account funds may lead to procrastination and, ultimately,
inaction).
293 See Hearings on Enron and Beyond Enhancing Worker Retirement Secur-
ity, supra note 119 (testimony of Mr. Norman Stein, Professor of Law, University
of Alabama School of Law) ("[G]iving employees a diversification option for
employer stock is not enough. We have learned from behavioral economists that
inertia is a powerful force in human behavior and that many employees are unlikely
to take affirmative action to diversify because of inertia.").
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2. Overvaluing Pension Reform Proposals
Aimed at Alerting 401 (k)Plan Participants to the Dangers
Associated with Company Stock Investment
The House Bill contains ancillary pension reform measures that
theoretically increase participants' ability to gain and assimilate informa-
tion about the inherent dangers of 401(k) plan investment in company
stock. Among the most glorified is the House Bill's investment advice
proposal, 94 which has been promoted as "the most important pension
protection of all." '295 Supporters expressed the view that Enron employees
"might have been able to preserve their retirement savings if they'd had
access to a qualified adviser who would have warned them in advance that
they needed to diversify.2 96
The House Bill's investment advice proposal creates a prohibited
transaction exemption under ERISA and the Code for investment advice
provided by "fiduciary advisers." ' Attempting to mitigate the costs
294 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. § 105 (2003).
295 Press Release, Committee on Education and the Workforce, NASDAQ
Urges Senate to Consider Boehner Investment Advice Bill to Help Workers Protect
their Retirement Savings (May 15, 2002), at http://edworkforce.house.gov/press/
press 107/invnasdaq51502.htm. Representative Boehner stated that "[i]n the wake
of the Enron collapse, expanding worker access to quality investment advice is the
most important pension protection of all." Id.
296 Press Release, Plans to Reintroduce Pension Security Act, supra note 41;
Fact Sheet, House Education & the Workforce Committee, Enron and Global
Crossing Response Summary: Strengthening Retirement Security and Enhancing
Corporate Responsibility (May 10, 2002), at http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/
107th/workforce/enron/JABOxleyKitl .htm ("Like most U.S. companies, Enron did
not provide its workers with access to professional investment advice. Such advice
would have alerted Enron workers to the need to diversify their accounts and
enabled many to preserve their retirement savings.").297H.R. 1000 § 105; see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG.,
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3762, THE
"PENSION SECURITY ACT OF 2002" 14 (Comm. Print 2002), http://www.house.
gov/jctlx-24-02.pdf [hereinafter STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION] ("The provision adds a new category of prohibited transaction
exemptions in connection with the provision of investment advice with respect to
plan assets for a fee if (1) the investment of plan assets is subject to the direction
of plan participants or beneficiaries, (2) the advice is provided to the plan or a
participant or beneficiary by a fiduciary advisor in connection with a sale,
acquisition or holding of a security or other property (an 'investment transaction')
for purposes of investment of plan assets, and (3) certain other requirements are
met.").
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associated with hiring an independent investment adviser,298 the House Bill
allows interested parties (those that are already receiving fees or commis-
sions for services rendered to the plan) to serve as fiduciary advisers, as
long as they assume fiduciary liability for their advice and meet certain
disclosure requirements aimed at notifying participants of potential
conflicts of interest.299 Plan fiduciaries, other than the fiduciary adviser,
would not be responsible for monitoring the specific investment advice
given by the fiduciary adviser to any particular participant; however, they
would remain liable, under a fiduciary's duty of prudence, for the initial
selection and monitoring of the fiduciary advisor.300
In addition to its investment advice proposal, the House Bill imposes
additional disclosure and informational requirements on employers and
plan administrators. Increasing ERISA's current requirement that 401(k)
plan participants receive benefit statements on an annual basis, 301 the House
Bill requires that certain individual account plans provide quarterly benefit
statements outlining the importance of plan asset diversification, the current
value of company stock investments, the inherent risks of excessive
investment in company stock, and plan diversification restrictions on
company stock investment.30 2 The House Bill also contains an investment
education notice requirement under which certain individual account plans
would be required to provide participants with a notice upon commencing
plan participation and on an annual basis thereafter.30 3 The investment
298 See Press Release, House Education & the Workforce Committee, Senate
Democrat Bill Will Leave Millions of Workers Without Investment Advice,
Boehner Says, at http://edworkforce.house.gov/press/press107/invadv3602.htm
(Mar. 6, 2002) (criticizing Senate investment advice proposal mandating
independent investment advisers on the ground that it "would significantly increase
the cost and administrative burden required of employers to provide these
services").299 H.R. 1000 § 105 (including requirements that the fiduciary adviser inform
participants of the relationship between the plan sponsor and the fiduciary adviser,
any fees and commissions the adviser will be receiving, and any other disclosures
required under applicable securities laws).
300 Id.
301 ERISA § 105(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1025(b) (2000) (requiring that plan admin-
istrators provide plan participants and beneficiaries with a summary of the benefits
and investment alternatives offered under the plan and a benefit statement once
every twelve-month period).
302 H.R. 1000 § 101(a) (providing that requirement applies to individual
account plans, other than stand-alone ESOPs).
3031 d. § 101 (b).
[VOL. 92
2003-2004] PENSION REFORM IN THE AFTERMATH OF ENRON
education notice would include an explanation of generally accepted
investment principles, as well as the inherent risks of company stock
investment.3 °4
The blackout notification requirements 35 enacted under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act3°6 are also meant to "offer [affected participants] ample oppor-
tunity to assess current investment decisions, and to adjust their exposure
to loss if they wish to do So. ' 307 These requirements mandate that plan
administrators generally provide a thirty-day advance written or electronic
notice to affected participants of any impending blackout period,30 8 with
such notice including information about the unique risks associated with
excessive investment in company stock and information meant to alert
participants of the inherent risks of maintaining their account asset
investment in company stock during a blackout period.30 9
Numerous factors indicate that these pension reform measures are not
the talisman for promoting sufficient plan asset diversification and may
304 Id.
305 See ERISA § 101(i)(7) (2003).
306 Id. § 101(i) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 306(b)(1) (enacted on
July 30, 2002)).
307 Final Rule Relating to Notice of Blackout Periods to Participants and
Beneficiaries, 68 Fed. Reg. 3716, 3723 (Jan. 24, 2003) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R.
§ 2520).
308 See ERISA § 101(i)(7) (defining a blackout period as any period of three
or more consecutive business days during which the ability of participants in an
individual account plan to "direct or diversify assets credited to their accounts, to
obtain loans from the plan, or to obtain distributions from the plan is temporarily
suspended, limited or restricted").
309 Id. The notice is to include: the reason for the blackout; identification of the
investments and other rights that are affected; the expected beginning date and
length of the blackout period; and a statement that individuals should evaluate the
appropriateness of their current investment decisions in light of their inability to
direct or diversify assets credited to their accounts. Id.; see also Model Notice of
Blackout Period, 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-3(e)(4) (2003) ("For your long-term
retirement security, you should give careful consideration to the importance of a
well-balanced and diversified investment portfolio, taking into account all of your
assets, income and investments.... You should be aware that there is a risk to
holding substantial portions of your assets in the securities of any one company, as
individual securities tend to have wider price swings, up and down, in short periods
of time, than investments in diversified funds. Stocks that have wide price swings
might have a large loss during the blackout period, and you would not be able to
direct the sale of such stocks from your account during the blackout period.").
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instead create a false sense of security for American workers.3t ° The
efficacy of each measure is based on the same ideological underpinnings
supporting ERISA 404(c) fiduciary liability relief, which is that participants
are capable of making independent investment decisions among employer-
selected investment alternatives and of exercising control over their
individual account plan assets. Recent studies by behavioral economists
raise serious questions about plan participants' actual decision-making
abilities given the context-dependence of these plans and other psychologi-
cal influences.31'
One aspect of context-dependence, referred to as the "framing effect,"
stems from employers' power to select investment alternatives and direct
employer contributions to one or more investment alternatives. This power
allows employers and other plan fiduciaries to retain significant influence
over participant investment decisions, including asset allocations." 2 While
there is some evidence to suggest that increasing the number of investment
alternatives mitigates the framing effect,313 the presence of a company stock
investment alternative, particularly where employer contributions are made
310 See Fact Sheet, House Education & the Workforce Committee, Fact vs.
Fiction: The Bipartisan Pension Security Act (H.R. 3762) (Feb. 19, 2002), at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/l 07th/workforce/enron/factsheet 1 .htm.
Senator Edward Kennedy stated that: "the proposals by the Administration to
reform our pension system simply create false hope. The President's plan would
not have prevented the Enron workers from losing their retirement savings." Id.
311 See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Risk Aversion or Myopia?
Choices in Repeated Gambles and Retirement Investments, 45 MGMNT. Sci. 364
(1999); Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in
Defined Contribution Savings Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 82 (2001) (finding
employees' allocation decisions dependent on available fund alternatives).
312 See Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely, supra note 131, at 378; Stabile,
The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, supra note 292, at 88
("The fact that the employer's choice of investment options has such an influence
on participant choices, effectively framing or cabining the participant's control,
complicates the causation analysis and should cause us to reconsider Congress's
allocation of responsibility between participant and plan sponsor."); Sara Holden
& Jack VanDerhei, 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan
Activity in 2000, ISSUES IN BRIEF, Nov. 2001, at 4, at http://www.ebri.org/pdfs/
10 1 ib.pdf (fmding that plan design influences participants' asset allocations).
313 NELLIE LIANG & SCOTT WEISBENNER, INVESTOR BEHAVIOR AND THE
PURCHASE OF COMPANY STOCK IN 401(K) PLANS-THE IMPORTANCE OF PLAN
DESIGN 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 9131,2002), http://
www.papers.nber.org/papers/w9131.pdf (finding that company stock purchases
decline with an increase in investment offerings).
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in the form of company stock, negates this mitigation and enhances the
framing effect. Participants see the employer's choice to offer a company
stock investment alternative and to direct employer contributions to that
alternative as "implicit investment advice" with respect to the prudence of
such an investment, which results in significant investment in company
stock.3
14
In addition to "design" context-dependence, other psychological factors
influence participants' ability to make independent investment decisions,
including overconfidence in the employer and a misplaced sense of
employee loyalty. Overconfidence in the employer is often based on the
past performance of company stock in relation to other investment
alternatives. Based on that past performance, participants project future
gains to be derived from company stock investments and invest accord-
ingly.315 Experts agree that overconfidence in company stock is unwar-
ranted with the rate of return on company stock no higher than the rate of
return on a diversified portfolio and past gains being a poor predictor of a
stock's future performance.
1 6
Employee loyalty also promotes participant investment in company
stock and is often based on real or perceived pressures applied by
employers and their executives. As evidenced by the apparent communica-
tions from Enron executives to Enron 401 (k) Plan participants,317 employ-
3 4 Benartzi, supra note 251, at 1752 ("When-the match is in cash, employees
invest 18 percent of their own contributions to company stock; when the match is
in company stock, employees invest more (29 percent) of their own contributions
in company stock. It is possible that employees interpret stock matches as an
endorsement or as implicit investment advice."); EBRI Special Report: Company
Stock in 401(k) Plans, supra note 8, at 2 (finding that, while the "aggregate
percentage of 401(k) assets that are in company stock is equal to 19 percent,"
where company stock is offered "as either an employer match and/or an employee
investment option, 32 percent of plan assets are in company stock if the plan
sponsor does not offer a GIC (guaranteed investment contract, a stable-value
investment) and 28 percent if it does")
3's Benartzi, supra note 251, at 1762 ("[A]llocations to company stock are
correlated with past returns but not with future returns, which is consistent with the
excessive extrapolation hypothesis.").
316 Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 4, at 31.
317 Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 182 (written statement of
Thomas Padgett, supra note 13); see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Despite Warning,
Enron Chief Urged Buying Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at Al (noting that
CEO Kenneth Lay reportedly had an online chat with Enron employees indicating
that Enron company stock continued to be a sound investment a week after he was
directly notified about Enron's questionable accounting practices).
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ers will continue to offer optimistic forecasts of corporate performance and
the long-term profit potential of company stock investments, and such
pronouncements will play on institutionally-fostered employee loyalty
norms, which will in turn affect participant decision-making abilities.
Even if the effect of context-dependence and other psychological
factors influencing participant investment decisions are discounted and the
premise that participants can theoretically heed the warnings contained in
the ancillary pension reform measures is accepted, however, the potential
effectiveness of each of the aforementioned pension reform measures
remains questionable. The House Bill's investment advice proposal
contains numerous procedural and substantive problems. A procedural
problem arises from the decision to legislate investment advice under
ERISA and the Code. In her recent article, Professor Dana M. Muir
indicates that regulating investment advisers through ERISA "raises a
number of concerns because of the states' and the [Securities Exchange
Commission's ("SEC")] existing authority over, and expertise with,
investment advisers."'31 8 The House Bill's investment advice proposal
defines "fiduciary adviser" to include certain banks or similar financial
institutions and insurance companies qualified to do business under the
laws of the state but not necessarily registered with either the state or the
SEC.319 Professor Muir indicates that the extension of the definition of
adviser to individuals who are not registered with a state or the SEC
introduces individuals into the process who have not been historically
regulated and adds an additional layer of complication to the regulatory
scheme.320
A substantive issue arises because the House Bill's investment advice
proposal allows interested parties to provide investment advice to
participants without seeking the services of an independent investment
adviser.32" ' This is a significant departure from ERISA's party-in-interest
rules. As previously noted, ERISA's prohibited transaction rules currently
preclude interested third party service providers from rendering independ-
38 Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment
Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB.
L. 1, 46 (2002).
1'9 H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. § 105(g)(6)(A)(ii), (iii) (2003).
320 Muir, supra note 318, at 48 ("The extension of the prohibited transaction
exemption [of H.R. 2269] to individuals who are not registered with a state or the
SEC as an investment adviser further complicate the regulatory scheme.").
321 H.R. 1000 § 105; see also SunAmerica Opinion, supra note 176 (sanc-
tioning interested third-party investment advise based on independent financial
expert asset allocation recommendations).
[VOL. 92
2003-2004] PENSION REFORM IN THE AFTERMATH OF ENRON
ent investment advice on any investment alternative for which the provider
may receive an additional fee as a result of the participants' investment
decisions.322
The importance of appointing independent investment advisers can be
traced back to ERISA' s legislative and regulatory history, which repeatedly
raised the concern of whether interested parties can effectively carry out
their fiduciary responsibilities.323 The appointment of interested investment
advisers creates conflicts of interests, the types of conflicts that led to pre-
ERISA abuses. Interested investment advisers may strongly identify with
the employer's own vision of the company's future profitability and may
find it difficult to formulate an independent perspective on the true value
of company stock.324 Interested investment advisers may also be influenced
by some of the same psychological factors that influence participant
investment decisions, such as a sense of loyalty or commitment to the
company and its policies, and company efforts to promote company stock
ownership and organizational pressure to buy and own company stock.
Additionally, the appointment of interested investment advisers opens the
door to conflicted advice from providers who have financial incentives to
promote their own offerings. These conflicts cannot be resolved by
requiring plan fiduciaries to prudently select and monitor investment
advisers, by placing broadly defined limitations on the class of persons who
can serve as investment advisers, or by implementing disclosure require-
322 See ERISA § 406(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1 106(b)(1) (2000) ("A fiduciary with
respect to a plan shall not deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for
his own account."); id. § 406(b)(3) ("A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not
receive any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with
such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan.").
323 56 Fed. Reg. 10,724, 10,734 (Mar. 13, 1991) ("The Department believes the
involvement of an independent fiduciary is a critical element in ensuring the
meaningful exercise of independent control by participants with respect to
investments in employer securities. In this regard, the proposal provides that the
'independent fiduciary' cannot be affiliated with any sponsor of the plan."); Private
Pension Plans: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the Joint
Economic Comm., 89th Cong. *123 (1966) (statement of Willard Solenberger,
Assistant Director of the Social Security Department of the International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW), AFL-CIO) ("This idea of an independent fiduciary with responsibility for
the investments has been one of the principles that underly UAW plans.").
324 See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 563 (3d Cir. 1995) (conflict of
interest allegations go to the issue of whether ERISA fiduciaries who hold
directorships can make impartial decisions or whether impartial decision-making
is impossible).
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ments under which investment advisers disclose outstanding conflicts of
interest.3 2
5
A second substantive issue exists since there is no empirical evidence
that employers will embrace the House Bill's investment advice proposal
and engage the services of fiduciary advisers. While the House Bill
ostensibly limits employers' and other plan fiduciaries' liability for the
consequences of investment advice provided by fiduciary advisers, the bill
fails to sufficiently address co-fiduciary liability concerns arising from the
ill-defined retained fiduciary duty to prudently select and to periodically
monitor the activities of fiduciary advisers, as well as monitor fiduciary
advisers' potential conflicts of interest and fee arrangements.326
To be effective, any voluntary investment advice measure must include
co-fiduciary guidelines.327 In her detailed analysis of the House Bill's
investment advice proposal, Professor Muir proposes the adoption of "a
nonexclusive safe harbor" that addresses the procedural, interested party,
and co-fiduciary liability concerns. Under her proposal, the nonexclusive
safe harbor would apply where (1) a plan offers "at least two choices of
investment advisory firms," with "at least one of the choices [qualifying]
as an independent adviser," (2) "the plan fiduciary [possesses] a good faith
belief based upon a reasonable investigation that every investment advisory
firm providing services ... is registered as an investment adviser with the
SEC," and (3) "the plan fiduciary [undertakes] an annual review sufficient
to maintain a good faith belief that each investment advisory firm...
remains registered with the SEC. 329
If the three requirements are met, plan fiduciaries, other than the
investment adviser, would be exempt "from liability for ERISA's fiduciary
selection and monitoring requirements, as well as from 404(c) noncompli-
ance."330 Absent a safe harbor, such as the one proposed by Professor Muir,
325 See The Retirement Security Advice Act of 2001: Hearings on H.R. 2269:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Educ. & Workforce, 107th Cong. (2001) (state-
ment of Jon W. Breyfogle, representing American Council of Life Insurers).326 H.R. 1000 § 105.
327 See Muir, supra note 318, at 50 ("Unless employers can become comfor-
table that they are able, with reasonable efforts, to meet their fiduciary obligations
in monitoring the provision of investment advice, they will almost certainly be
unwilling to retain entities to provide that advice.").328 Id. at 5 1.
329 id.
330 id.
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plan fiduciaries will likely refrain from voluntarily appointing interested
party fiduciary advisers.3
A third substantive issue arises because there is no evidence that a
significant portion of participants will utilize the fiduciary adviser's
services, even where the cost of such services is not passed through to
participants. In a recent survey conducted by Human Capital Advisory
Services and Pensions and Investments magazine,332 81% of plan sponsors
that offer investment advice to participants reported that less than 25% of
participants actually take advantage of the service, even though, under the
majority of plans, the participants were not charged for the investment
advice services.333
The House Bill's quarterly benefit statement and investment education
notice requirements do little more than reflect current practices by the vast
majority of large publicly traded companies.334 Further, the dissemination
of a quarterly benefit statement is only mandated where an individual
account plan does not otherwise electronically post (e.g., through the
company's internet site) its informational requirements. An overwhelming
majority of large publicly traded companies provide access to plan and
131 See Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans
Today, supra note 175, at 81-85 (outlining proposals that entail "providing
guidance to employers" regarding both "the duty to monitor" and "co-fiduciary
liability for investment advisor conduct").
332 See Deloitte & Touche 401(k) Survey Sheds New Light on 401(k) Reform
Debate, at http://www.benefitslink.com/articles/washbull021118.1.shtml (last
modified Oct. 10, 2003) (reporting on Deloitte & Touche's 2002 Annual 401(k)
Benchmarking Survey, conducted by Human Capital Advisory Services and
Pensions and Investments magazine and included in the Nov. 18, 2002 issue of
Deloitte & Touche's Washington Bulletin).
333 Id. ("It is not clear whether [either the House or Senate investment advice]
proposals would make 401 (k) plan sponsors more interested in offering investment
advice to participants. The real barrier... may be a lack of employee interest.
According to the Survey, a solid majority (81 percent) of sponsors offering
investment advice report that less than 25 percent of participants actually take
advantage of it. (This is particularly surprising in light of the fact that only 21
percent of those surveyed indicated that participants pay for this advice.)"); see
also PSCA 45TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PROFIT SHARING AND 401 (K) PLANS, supra
note 178, at 52 ("When investment advice is offered, usage by participants is
greatest in plans with fewer than 50 participants (56.6%) and least in plans with
over 5,000 participants (31.1%).").
334 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note
297, at 16.
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account information on their Internet sites.33 With minor modifications to
reflect the proposal's content requirements, these companies could avoid
separate issuance of the quarterly benefit statement.
With respect to the blackout notification requirements enacted under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, while blackout periods are commonly utilized by
plan administrators to facilitate changes in investment alternatives or
recordkeepers, and during times of corporate restructuring (mergers,
acquisitions, spinoffs), in the life of any given plan, they are an infrequent
occurrence. Based on its review of limited statistical reporting, the
DOL estimates that only 25% of affected plans impose a blackout period
during any given year, with plans sponsored by large, publicly traded
companies, who are more likely to offer company stock as an investment
alternative, implementing blackout periods as infrequently as once every
three to four years.336 Furthermore, while the Act's notice requirements
formalize the types of information that must be provided to affected
participants, ERISA Section 404(c) plan administrators have, in the past,
routinely provided notice of impending blackout periods,337 as evidenced
by the series of email blackout notifications issued by Enron 401 (k) Plan
administrators prior to implementation of the October-November 2001
335 PSCA 45TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PROFIT SHARING AND 401 (K) PLANS, supra
note 178, at 55. Of plans with 5000 or more participants, 79.9% provide for
contribution changes, 89.4% provides for balance inquiries, and 88.8% provide for
investment changes using the companies' internet site. Id.
336 Interim Final Rule Relating to Notice of Blackout Periods to Participants
and Beneficiaries, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,766, 64,771 (Oct. 21, 2002) ("The Department
reviewed available literature in an effort to establish a reasonable estimate of the
frequency of blackout periods that would trigger notice requirements. One small
survey of administrators of very large plans indicated that their largest plans had
undergone a blackout period at a rate of once each three to four years. A different
survey indicated a lower frequency of blackout periods, at a rate in the area of
about 7% of plans per year. No comprehensive statistics on this frequency are
available. However, the Department is aware that the imposition of blackout
periods is not rare. For this purpose, the Department has assumed that potentially
affected plans will impose blackout periods on average once each 4 years.... The
Department believes that the assumption that 25% of potentially affected plans will
impose a blackout period in any given year results in a reasonable estimate of the
number of plans that will actually be affected.").
337 Id. at 64,769 ("While many plan administrators may currently provide dis-
closures similar to those required by the statute and interim final rule, this new
requirement will ensure that appropriate information is provided in a consistent and
timely manner.").
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blackout period.338 Participants' receipt of modified blackout notices every
three to four years fails to adequately stress the dangers of excessive
company stock holdings.
III. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
For an increasing number of American workers, 401(k) plans are
becoming their primary source of employer-sponsored retirement
benefits.339 No longer relegated to the supplemental status that historically
justified promotion of the employee ownership goal in traditional individ-
ual account plans, American workers can ill afford retirement plans that
allow them to place all of their eggs in one basket and then leave them
solely responsible for watching that basket.340
To ensure that 401(k) plan participants spend their golden years in
secure retirement instead of working under the golden arches, Congress
must enact pension reform that strikes a balance between protecting
participants and not deterring employers from sponsoring or making
contributions to 401(k) plans.341' That appropriate balance does not,
however, dictate rejecting overall limitations on 401 (k) plan investment in
company stock. These plans bear no resemblance to the supplemental
individual account plans that originally warranted special treatment,342 and
there are important public policy and tax policy reasons for ensuring 401 (k)
plan participants' retirement security.343
338 See Hearings on the Enron Collapse, supra note 6, at 281 (Appendix H,
Submitted for the Record, E-Mail from ID from Human Resources News, to All
PGE Employees (Sept. 27, 2001), E-Mail from Enron Announcements to All Enron
Employees (Oct. 16, 2001), E-Mail from Enron Announcements to All Enron
Employees (Oct. 22, 2001), and E-Mail from Enron Announcements to All Enron
Employees (Oct. 26, 2001)).
331 See supra notes 34 & 117 (indicating the decline in defined benefit plan
coverage and the dominant role of 401(k) plans).
340 MARK TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 148 (1894) ("Put all your eggs in the
one basket and-WATCH THAT BASKET.").
34' EBRI Special Report: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, supra note 8, at 3
("[A]ny recommendations to modify current pension law would attempt to strike
a balance between protecting employees and not deterring employers from offering
employer matches to 401 (k) plans.").
342 See supra notes 63 & 64 (explaining the special purpose of supplemental
individual account plans).
343 Pension Plan Overhaul in Wake ofEnron Collapse: Hearings on H.R. 1O:
Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of Comm. on Educ. &
Workforce, 107th Cong. 33-37 (2002) (testimony of Erik Olson, Board Member
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The Senate Finance Bill's "choice" proposal strikes an appropriate
balance by increasing diversification without providing a disincentive to
employers."' Under the choice proposal, employers can continue making
employer matching contributions in the form of company stock or the
employer can include company stock as an investment alternative for
employee elective deferral contributions. 345 Additionally, the choice
proposal generally applies to all individual account plans that provide for
participant-directed investment, and, therefore, addresses hybrid KSOPs.346
To reap the touted tax and other benefits, the likely effect of the choice
proposal is that employers will prospectively limit 401(k) plan company
stock holdings to employer contributions made in the form of company
stock. The removal of a participant-directed company stock investment
alternative will result in a greater degree of diversification over time, as
evidenced by the fact that 89% of the Enron 40 1(k) Plan's company stock
concentration was attributable to participant-directed investment in
company stock.
The Senate Finance Bill's choice proposal also effectively limits the
impact of the requirement to participant-directed individual account plans
that serve as participants' primary source of employer-based retirement
income. Under a safe harbor, employers that sponsor a defined benefit plan
that provides certain levels of coverage and benefits are exempt from the
"choice" restriction.347 In other words, employers that sponsor traditional
defined benefit plans as their primary retirement plans and adopt supple-
AARP) ("There is a legitimate and substantial public policy interest in ensuring
that the assets of ERISA-govemed, trusteed, tax-qualified retirement plans are
invested in a prudent, diversified manner, so as to minimize the risk that the tax
advantages accorded to those assets will fail to achieve their intended purpose of
providing additional economic security in retirement.").
44 S. 1992, 107th Cong. § 102 (2002).
345 Id.
3" See generally id.
341 See id. This restriction would apply to both publicly-traded and closely-held
stock. However, the restriction would not apply if the employer also maintains a
"qualified defined benefit plan," which is defined as a plan that covers at least 90%
of the individuals that are covered by the defined contribution plan and provides
an accrued benefit that is actuarially equivalent to at least 1.5% of the participant's
final average pay times years of service. The rationale supporting the "qualified
defined benefit plan" exception is that the presence of such a plan adequately
secures retirement benefits to the employer's employee, and the defined
contribution plan is relegated to its historical status as a supplemental retirement
plan.
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mental individual account plans will not be affected by the restriction.
Thus, the safe harbor relegates the employee ownership goal to its
historical status as a secondary goal of ERISA. Within that context, plan
fiduciaries can continue to offer an unrestricted company stock investment
alternative as long as it is a prudent investment offering.
Meaningful pension reform must also include measures requiring the
appointment of an independent fiduciary as a cost of sponsoring an ERISA
Section 404(c) plan with a company stock investment alternative. As
originally envisioned under ERISA Section 404(c) revised proposed
regulations, 3 4 an independent fiduciary who is not affiliated with the plan
sponsor can help ensure that both the initial selection and retention of a
company stock investment alternative is prudent, that company stock is
removed as an investment alternative where found to be an imprudent
investment, and that the employer and other plan fiduciaries are not
exerting improper influence over plan participants' investment decisions.
Pension reform must also include measures mandating employer-
facilitated individually-tailored investment advice as a condition of ERISA
Section 404(c) fiduciary liability relief.349 An independent fiduciary can
militate against employer influences that inappropriately promote company
stock investment, but cannot encourage prudent investment selection
among other investment alternatives.
Transferring investment decisions and risks to participants who lack the
financial acuity to make informed decisions is a recipe for disaster. At least
by mandating employer-facilitated individually-tailored investment advice,
participants will be given the opportunity to attain the necessary tools for
making prudent investment decisions. Further, to ensure that the investment
adviser is acting "solely in the interest of participants,"35 that adviser must
be independent and free from conflicts of interest. Employers must see the
cost of providing independent, individually-tailored investment advice as
the cost of ERISA Section 404(c) fiduciary liability relief, which when
measured against potential fiduciary liability for billions of dollars in plan
losses, is inconsequential.
348 Proposed Rulemaking for Participant Directed Individual Account Plans,
56 Fed. Reg. 10,724, 10,734 (Mar. 13, 1991).
349 Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today,
supra note 175, at 74.
350 ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1) (2000).

